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Abstract
Recent contributions in the environmental literature seem to suggest that
incentives to environmental research is lower than incentives to ordinary re-
search, arguing in favor for additional support for environmental R&D. Their
arguments are based on the conjecture of the commitment problem. Since
the government influences incentives implicitly through their environmental
policy, they may be tempted to expropriate rents from the successful innova-
tion with strategic taxation. In this thesis I analyze whether the incentives
to environmental R&D is systematically lower, due to both the appropri-
ability problem and the commitment problem. Secondly I investigate how
an inducement prize to environmental innovations can remedy these market
failures. My conclusion on the standard commitment problem confirm the
results in Greaker and Hoel (2011) where a ranking of incentives is arbitrary,
depending on parameter values. This gives no reason to frequently use of
innovation prizes to environmental R&D. I therefore expand the analysis and
introduce a political disturbance, investigating whether this gives a specific
ranking. It turns out that intermediate disturbance gives a distinct under-
provision of environmental R&D. For this special case innovation prizes will
restore the optimal level of incentives. The thesis contains of a historical in-
troduction and a discussion of innovation prizes as an inducement mechanism
for environmental R&D.
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Summary
In this thesis I discuss ex ante inducement prizes as an instrument for promoting
innovation, with special focus on environmental R&D. The question is whether we
can prove by economic theory that environmental research should be prioritized in
R&D support programs. The model in this thesis is based on a working paper by
Greaker and Hoel (2011), where they show that a comparison of envionmental R&D
and ordinary market good R&D gives no specific ranking. I expand their model my
including an aspect of political economy to investigate how an extended commitment
problem could be solved by an innovation prize. My conclusion is a possible ranking
for intermediate political disturbance.
From the literature on innovation economics the under-provision of R&D rises
from the appropriability problem. Knowledge is a public good with no boundaries
on its consumption. Every innovator contributes to the common pool of knowledge.
This positive externality is not taken into account by innovators, resulting in too
little knowledge creation. Since knowledge and ideas easily spill between sectors, the
innovator is not able to extract the total gain from her invention, decreasing further
motivation to invest in R&D. The appropriability problem is the justification for
governmental interference and support of research.
In the sector of environmental research the demand for new green technology is
created indirectly through the emission tax, and hence the incentives to invest in
environmental R&D. Literature on political economy has showed that policies tend
to be inefficient over time. Current politicians do not manage to bind their actions
when no outside institution enforces such commitments. The results from Greaker
and Hoel (2011) depends crucially on timing of governmental intervention. If the
innovator act after the environmental policy is implemented the government would
be tempted to influence the spread of the innovation by strategic taxation. The
innovator sets a price on her innovation, named a license fee, as best response to the
policy. The government is therefore able to put a downward pressure on the fee by
lowering the tax. The intention is to maximize welfare, but the result is decreasing
incentives. This is refereed to as the expropriation problem, a concurrent issue with
the commitment problem.
In the case of environmental R&D the commitment problem amplify the appro-
priability problem, craving for an investigation of the effect on incentives. Based on
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these market failures one can argue in favor of additional support to environmental
R&D. Greaker and Hoel (2011) aim to compare the incentives to R&D in a general
model set up, investigating whether there exist specific differences in the incentives
to invest in ordinary market good R&D compared to environmental R&D. If there
are systematic differences, it justifies a diversion in R&D support programs.
The question is whether the appropriability problem is superior in the case of
environmental R&D due to the commitment problem. Greaker and Hoel (2011)
state that no systematic ranking of the different R&D incentives is possible, hence
no particular reason for additional support to environmental R&D. My hypothesis
is that the incentives to environmental R&D is larger than market good R&D, and
I will investigate whether I can find a special scenario where this holds. It turns out
not to be as clear as first thought.
This thesis’ extension is to include an aspect of political disturbance. I introduce
interest groups that influence the taxation decision of the government with the aim
of protecting private profit. The welfare maximizing government, or equivalent the
benevolent social planner, suffers from “weakness of will”, setting the policy with a
biased welfare objective. The underlying reason for investigating this special case
is an impression of a weak environmental policy where the global emission tax is
too low. The aspect of political disturbance give me a model with an extended
commitment problem.
My aim is to compare the incentives in a laissez-faire R&D scenario to the incen-
tives to environmental R&D with lobbyism. The model is as general and basic as
possible, increasing the relevance of my results. My findings for a general commit-
ment problem follows the result in Greaker and Hoel; no special ranking of incentives
to market good R&D and environmental R&D with a benevolent planner is possible.
But in case of the extended commitment problem the incentives to environmental
R&D is systematically lower for intermediate influence of lobby groups. The result
breaks if we look at the two extreme cases with either total lobbyism or no influence.
When incentives to environmental R&D is sufficiently lower than to market goods
R&D, I show how an inducement prize may restore the social optimal level of in-
centives. This result argues in the favor for diverse R&D support with additional
inducement to the sector of environmental R&D.
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1 Introduction
There is broad consensus about the need of drastic change in the way societies
produce goods and generate energy if we shall combat climate change and reach
the 2° target, agreed on at the Copenhagen Accord. The ambitious objective is
to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system and this
thesis is meant to contribute to the literature on how to accomplish this.
In the latest report by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) the
panel state that continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) will cause further
global warming. Limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC 2013). IPCC recommend a 50%
reduction by 2050, and a reduction of 100% by 2100 from the GHG level in 2010.
In the science article “Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability:
Energy for a Green House Planet” researchers from diverse fields argue that climate
change is an energy problem, and currently we lack the technology to reach the goal
set by UNFCCC:
Arguably, the most effective way to reduce CO2 emissions with economic
growth and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology
of energy production, distribution, storage and conversion (Hoffert et.
al. 2002, page 981).
In other words, a possible solution to climate change could be a technological rev-
olution. Hoffert et. al. (2002) further claims that a stabilization of carbon dioxide
will require research on alternative energy sources for the coming decades: “We con-
clude that a broad range of intensive research and development is urgently needed
to produce technological options that can allow stabilization and economic develop-
ment” (page 981). The world is in need of a technological breakthrough and radical
inventions in alternative energy sources to prevent climate change.
Economic theory has showed that research and development (R&D) is under-
provided in the private market as a result of positive externalities from knowledge
spillovers. In environmental economics this market failure interacts with the addi-
tional negative externality from emissions. This complicates the analysis of inno-
vation policies. Should we adopt policies that corrects for the environmental exter-
nality or a policy that corrects the knowledge externality? Or are there sufficient
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policies that can correct for both? A complete understanding of the interaction be-
tween the two externalities and how these can be mitigated by governmental policy
is truly pertinent f pushing the forthcoming technological breakthrough and solving
the problem of climate change.
The patent system is implemented to deal with the externality of knowledge
spillovers. Additional instruments to induce R&D as subsidies and grants are used
by the government to accompany the patent system. This thesis will explore a less
common inducement mechanism, namely innovation prizes. I will analyze whether
prizes solve the commitment problem and whether they are especially suited to stim-
ulate environmental R&D in suboptimal surroundings due to lobbyism and govern-
mental “weakness of will”.
2 Economics of innovation
Technological progress is a result of ideas and innovation. Schumpeter has been
declared the founder of innovation theory in economics (Hall and Rosenberg 2010).
In the book The Theory of Economic Development (1934) Schumpeter forwarded
the idea of “creative destruction” by innovations. He argued that innovation is a
necessary condition for economic development. To stimulate innovation the govern-
ment needs to support innovators with credit funding (Schumpeter 2008). Without
entrepreneurs we would have a stagnating economy (Sweezy 1943). Schumpeter di-
vided the process into three phases; invention, development and diffusion. This is
referred to as the Schumpeterian trilogy of the technology process. The first stage
involves discovery and creation of new ideas. In the second stage these ideas are
developed, and at last the new product is sold and spread in the market.
Research and development (R&D) is a headline that includes fundamental re-
search, applied research and experimental development in both governmental and
private sector. The term R&D incorporates the first stages of the innovation pro-
cess including the creation and development of ideas. R&D consists of systematic
and creative investigation, using knowledge to identify new applications and dis-
coveries (Grupp 1998). This includes both the development of new products, and
improvements of existing goods.
After Schumpeter and his study of the technological process several theoretical
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directions of innovation theory has been developed, all based on Schumpeter’s contri-
bution. The literature on innovation theory is concerned with the underprovision of
innovation due to knowledge spillovers. Laffont and Tirole (1996) contributed to the
canon by looking at the interaction of the patent institution and the emission poli-
cies in context of pollution control. This thesis will follow in this direction, pointed
out by the Laffont and Tirole article and include the perspective of environmental
economics into the field of innovation to study R&D policies.
2.1 Knowledge externalities
Knowledge is a public good, characterized by being non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
There are no boundaries on its consumption. One agent’s use does not affect the
access of others. Knowledge is available everywhere, and preventing others from
using it is almost impossible. A new idea is difficult to control and hold exclusive.
Once it is revealed in the market it will leak and be easily copied (Foray 2004).
One way of visualizing the externality following the properties of a public good
is to think that all new ideas are built on old knowledge. Then each additional
innovation increases the pool of knowledge. Every innovator will contribute to the
pool of knowledge as long as the expected profits of an idea are positive. The social
loss occurs when the innovator does not take into account the positive spillover effect
on other firms (Stiglitz 2014), resulting in too little knowledge creation compared to
the socially optimal level. Innovation is therefore under-provided in a market free
from governmental interference, the laissez-faire market.
There will often exist diverse uncertainties in the field of R&D. The innovator
does not necessarily know whether the innovation will be successful, how large the
cost of production will be or the future demand of the product. In the industry of
ideas researchers have minor chance of gathering all surplus from their inventions.
Ideas are easily copied and the spill of knowledge is almost impossible to prevent.
Since the social surplus is not equal to the private value of knowledge, an externality
is created. This is known as the appropriability problem. Appropriability concerns
the innovator’s ability to harvest all return from her invention. Imitations and
involuntary flow of knowledge between innovating firms decrease the expected return
and thus also the incentives to innovate.
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2.2 R&D policies
To remedy the knowledge externality, governmental intervention is a necessity. The
patent system is implemented to correct for this market failure. Patents provide the
innovator with property rights to her private developments. There are three types
of “intellectual property”; copyright, trademarks and the patent system. When an
innovator holds a patent she becomes a monopoly supplier of the invention. In
economic theory a monopolist has the opportunity to charge a price higher than
the marginal cost of production. As a result, a smaller quantity of the product is
sold to a higher price than optimal. Each patent is therefore given with limited
duration to shorten monopoly activity. The patent system is introduced to remedy
an externality, but simultaneously an additional deadweight loss is created.
Boldrin and Levine (2008) raises a controversial question whether the patent
system have any positive effect on the innovation decision at all. They give examples
of how patents may slow the development of further knowledge and stagnating
competition. Intellectual property rights may be mistakenly identified as a necessary
evil that fosters innovation. Boldrin and Levine claim instead that patents are an
unnecessary evil: “(. . . ) there is no evidence that intellectual monopoly achieves the
desired purpose of increasing innovation and creation, it has no benefits” (page 11).
They support this daring conclusion by arguing that the positive short run effects
will be exceeded in the long run, because patents make innovations more costly and
discourage competitors to enter. They base their findings on empirical evidences
from the continued extension of patent protection in US, Europe and Japan.
To supplement the existing patent system, several inducement mechanisms are
available to the government. Research grants, subsidies and public research at uni-
versities and academies are common instruments. These supplements are necessary
for inducing development of non-patentable ideas and utilize the positive externali-
ties from R&D.
Under a stereotypical grant process the government has to make assumptions
based on limited information about the innovators’ risk and subsidize the effort of
the innovating firm regardless of success (Newell and Wilson 2005). When innovators
do not bear the risk of failure the incentives to efficient research may decrease. “For
example, if failure does not cost them anything, researchers might solicit contracts
or grants even when they know that their efforts have little chance of success” (page
4
9). The result is inefficient allocation of grants making this type of supplementary
R&D policy sub optimal. However, an overall goal of funded research is not always
to develop finite and completed outcomes, but to subsidize basic research with a
wider range such that the pool of knowledge expands. When the knowledge base
increases the diffusion of new information is pushed and knowledge spillovers is
maximized.
The different aspects mentioned above of how supplementary R&D policies af-
fects innovation indicates the importance of adjusted policies to the diverse sectors
of R&D. Commercial research and product development might need a different and
more specified type of inducement policy than basic research. Inducement prizes is
a mechanism that distinguishes from grants and patents in numerous ways. Where
grants are given early in the R&D process no matter outcome, prizes are only re-
warded in case of success. Where patentable ideas must satisfy the conditions by
the patent law office, a prize can be rewarded to specific research addressing special
innovation challenges in areas where patents do not perform well. Prize compe-
titions provide a change in the way innovation is financed and contribute to the
governmental toolbox of inducement mechanisms.
3 Inducement prizes
This thesis will analyze inducement prize competitions. Innovation contests generate
incentives to innovate that differ substantially from the patent system. The prize
funder1 announces the victory conditions and the monetary size of the prize ex ante.
The prize is not necessary a cash transfer. It could be a medal, a contract or another
type of honor. In this thesis only monetary transfers are considered. The funder
chooses the winning party after the contest. Often such competitions last for several
years either with a stated deadline, or they are valid until a winning solution arrives.
The possibility of winning encourages innovators to participate in the competi-
tion. Innovators must bear the up-front research expenditures. This implies that
participants must hold the necessary financials before the competition, and could
be a potential disadvantage. Costs and expenditures are not reimbursed, this may
rule out small firms and individual researchers that have good ideas but no funding.
1The prize funder could either be the government, a firm or a wealthy person.
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On the other hand, an innovator would also need funding to develop patentable in-
ventions. This means that prize competitions does not exclude existing innovators.
The prize funder only pay if the solution requested was developed, avoiding the sunk
costs in case of unsuccessful research.
An essential distinction between innovation prizes, as described in this thesis
and other rewards, is the ex ante perspective. Inducement prizes do not include
those that reward remarkable research such as the Nobel Prize. In these cases the
development of the idea is already implemented. This type of prizes reward past
breakthroughs. The purpose of innovation contests is to induce new knowledge.
In the literature this distinction between ex ante and ex post rewards can eas-
ily be confused, since both contexts use the term “prize”. An organized overview
of the previous literature on prizes is necessary to avoid confusion. Some papers
consider getting the patent rights equivalent to receiving a prize (Scotchmer 2004).
Others follow Wright (1983) where the prize, a lump sum transfer, rewards success-
ful projects ex post as a first best alternative to patents (Hopenhayn, Llobet and
Mitchell 2006; Newell and Wilson 2005; Chari, Golosov and Tsyvinski 2012). When
a prize is rewarded in these scenarios the discovery is set in public domain after the
competition. The purpose of this type of prizes are to avoid monopoly rents created
by patents, and to push the diffusion of the discovery.
In the article by Shavell and van Ypersele (2001) the innovator may choose either
patent or reward, and they show that this policy is superior to the patent system
alone. Kremer (1998) models a patent buyout scheme that uses auctions to estimate
the patent value to determine the buyout price. Kremer suggests that prizes could be
used to buy out patents instead of waiting until contest specifications is fulfilled. A
similar model of prizes occurs in Weyl and Tirole (2012). They design a mechanism
where an up-front prize is rewarded in combination with patents such to reduce
welfare loss from monopoly rents. The common feature of all these articles is that
prizes are considered an alternative to patents, and their main concern is to reduce
the deadweight loss from intellectual property rights.
In this thesis an alternative view is introduced. Prizes are not interpreted as
patent buyouts, but rather as a inducement mechanism accompanying patent rights
when the system is not performing well. Brennan, Macauley and Whitefoot (2012)
lists essential reasons for why the patent buyout literature does not succeed in
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explaining the type of ex ante prizes considered in this thesis. First, winning a
prize in this context is not necessarily equal to losing possible patent rights. The
contest can be designed in several ways, and do not necessarily block the opportunity
of getting a patent. Patent buyout may potentially discourage innovators to enter
the competition when winning is equivalent to loosing rights to their invention.
Second, prizes should only be used in cases where the victory conditions can be
clearly specified and the performances can be judged without ambiguity.
Another argument against the focus on the buyout literature is related to the
necessary size of a buyout reward. If the prize is set equal to the total social value
of the invention some prizes would become astronomical and the buyout mechanism
would never be sustainable for the governmental budget. This was one of Polanyi’s
concerns in the article Patent Reform:“(...) considering firstly whether it would not
be intolerably unfair to the taxpayers” (Polanyi 1944).
The size of the prize, as modeled in this thesis, is set at the level that would
induce enough incentives. Ex ante inducement prizes act as an extra pull to increase
R&D additional to the private patent value, and are therefore feasible to implement.
Implementing a patent buyout prize on the other hand, would offer several chal-
lenges. If prizes were supposed to replace the patent system completely, it would
imply heavy administrative challenges of estimating the correct value for every in-
vention (Newell and Wilson 2005). The revenue to these enormous buyout rewards
would have been collected with distortionary taxes, and the social gain from in-
creased incentives may be exceeded by the deadweight loss from tax raising.
I will take the existing patent system as given. Since the prize transfer is rel-
atively small I choose to neglect the issue of tax funding. A prize contest in my
context does not necessarily require a patent transfer. The winning innovator may
keep the patent rights. Removing market distortions from the existing patent sys-
tem is not a priority. Prizes are accompanying instruments, promoting innovation in
under-invested research fields where special circumstances lower the incentives. The
patent system is addressed to solve the problem of appropriability, but the system
of prizes does not rely on this approach. The contest is implemented with the aim
to create incentives and spurring new R&D in a social valuable direction.
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3.1 Historical prizes
Throughout history some valuable inventions have been developed as a result of prize
competitions. Today the prize mechanism is most common in architectural compe-
titions, except some new announcements in 2014. One could argue that the prize
mechanism has its renaissance in Europe these days. The European Commission
announced its first innovation challenge in 2011 where a German biopharmaceutical
company won the ¿2 million prize for their innovative vaccine technology in 2014.
After this success several new prizes were announced in 2014 under the name Hori-
zon Prizes. The prizes vary in extent from ¿500,000 to ¿3 million depending on the
solution requested. These prizes are not patent buy-outs but a single transfer to the
winner, with the binding assurance of producing the invention. The common feature
of all Horizon prizes is solutions with great social value either in terms of health,
communication or global data traffic. All fields are in need of a radical breakthrough
to manage continuous population growth.
The Innovation UK and the innovation charity organization Nesta announced
the Longitude prize 2014, a challenge that offers a £10 million prize to those that
solve the problem of global antibiotic resistance. The name of this contest refers to
the original Longitude Prize that was announced in 1714 and is known today as the
most famous example of a successful innovation contest.
March 25, 1714 The British government announced a prize contest as a response
to a petition from the Royal Navy and Captains of Her Majesty’s Ships to improve
navigation by finding a solution of measuring longitudes. The prize competition
consisted of several prizes. The grand prize of £20,000 was offered to the method
accurate within 0.5 degree, a prize of £15,000 to a method accurate within 40 minutes
and a £10,000 reward for measures of longitudes within 1 degree (Horrobin 1986). At
that time these amounts were truly astronomical reflecting the extent of the challenge
and the believed minor probability of succeeding. The announcement boosted the
field of navigational research and exited wide public interest. John Harrison, a self-
educated clockmaker, developed after many attempts the first reliable and accurate
hand-held chronometer. The experts of the Royal Society tried to deny him the
prize until King George III intervened and secured Harrison, at the age of 80, the
legitimately won award in 1773. This remarkable story of maybe the first well known
innovation prize provides a fine introduction to many aspects of the prize mechanism
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that will later be discussed in more detail.
The French government has had several innovation contests through history.
Two of the competitions in the late 18th century ended with successful innovations.
In 1775 the French Academy of Science announced a prize of 2,400 Livres for the
development of artificial alkali from inexpensive materials. The chemist Nicholas
Leblanc successfully produced soda from salt, but due to turbulent times in France
the revolutionary government refused to grant him the reward. The tragic story of
the unrewarded innovator ends with Leblanc committing suicide in 1806, but his
discovery provided the foundation of the French industrial chemical industry and
the process bears his name today (Davis and Davis 2004; Newell and Wilson 2005;
Davis 2002). The story of Nicholas Leblanc reflects the importance of a credible
prize and the danger of an unaccountable government.
The second prize was announced in 1795, twenty years later. The French Direc-
tory offered a 12,000 Franc reward for a method of preserving food under petition
from Napoleon. Nicolas Appert, a confectioner in Paris with no formal education,
experimented with vacuum sealed glass bottles that contained precooked food. After
15 years of experimenting he received the prize and opened a canning factory (Davis
and Davis 2004; Newell and Wilson 2005; Davis 2002). Both the story of John
Harrison and of Nicolas Appert illustrate the self-educated innovator that dares to
think out of ordinary conventions, and therefore manages so solve a problem of high
social value. They both started their experimentation and research after the prize
was announced and were undoubtedly induced by the high reward. Would these
inventions been discovered without a prize? Clearly the contests contributed to an
early technological breakthrough and opened for unschooled engineers to enter the
field.
Many more examples of innovation prizes could have been discussed in detail.
Through the 19th century the Fourneyton turbine and the rocket locomotive were
invented as a result of prize competitions. The article “Inducement Prizes and In-
novation” by Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas (2011) contributes to the literature with
an empirical overview that examine whether prizes have affected the technological
development. They use a dataset that reaches over 100 years on awards by the an-
nual technology contest organized by Royal Agricultural Society of England (RASE)
between 1839 and 1939. Their results reflect that prizes may be a significant induce-
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ment for innovation: “The contests organized by the RASE attracted large number
of inventor and the competitions as public events encouraged the diffusion of useful
knowledge across innovators” (Brunt et. al. 2011, page 6). An interesting result
from the analysis was that prestigious medals had higher inducement power than
money: “We detected statistically significant effects of monetary and medal awards
and we show that medal awards had the largest effect on patenting activity” (page
5). This may imply that the size of the prize is less important, and that reputation
and promotion has a significant importance.
Another article that uses historical events to analyze the effect of prizes is “How
Effective are Prizes as Incentives to Innovation? Evidence From Three 20th Century
Contests” by Davis and Davis (2004). The authors use three historical examples
to take a case-based retrospective view on the effect of prizes. They suggest that
if a prize system, in addition to the existing methods, manages to influence the
direction of research this instrument should be used in cases with potentially high
social welfare: “(. . . ) if welfare arguments for a specific prize contest are sufficiently
strong, this ‘change of direction’ argument must remain an important justification
for prize contest design” (page 25). The authors call for more analysis of assessing
the effects of an incentive prize system for social welfare.
4 Environmental R&D
In the field of environmental economics the negative externalities from pollution
complicates the analysis of incentives. Investments in environmental research is
somehow “double” under-provided because of two types of externalities. Both the
knowledge spillover that exists in all research fields, and the social damage from
pollution makes the level of environmental innovations suboptimal.
Environmental policies, such as emission taxes and the cap and trade system,
create the demand for environmental innovations. The polluting firm experiences
higher cost when the tax is implemented and this creates incentives to reduce the
cost by cutting emissions. Either the firm can invest in environmental R&D, or it
can buy new technology from a specialized innovator. Examples of environmental
research can either be green input substitutes, end-of-pipe cleaning technology or
new production methods that emit less emissions.
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The question is whether incentives created by environmental policies are satis-
factory. Jaffe, Newell and Stavin (2005) argue that it is unlikely that environmental
policy alone creates sufficient incentives for environmental R&D. They front the view
that optimal policies should also include instruments designed explicitly to foster in-
novation and stimulate new technology to internalize the environmental externality
(Jaffe et. al. 2005).
General economic theory gives no reason for why the positive externalities of
green R&D should be greater than in the field of ordinary marked goods R&D.
But there are reasons to believe that the incentives to invest in green R&D are
lower than to market good research. The necessary decline in emissions creates the
market and the demand for green technologies. By green innovation I mean an
end-of-pipe abatement technology, a cleaning invention that erases emissions and
decreases abatement costs with no impact on the production function. This type of
R&D is process-innovation that affects the manufacturing, a contrast to product-
innovation that improves quality of the product.
If the emission price generated by a carbon tax or quotas is too low the demand
for green substitutes will also be under the optimal level. When demand is low,
fewer incentives to invest in green R&D are generated. Innovators do not expect
high returns in a field with low demand since the patent value in the green technology
sector will be too low.
If environmental R&D has been under-provided for decades it may be that the
knowledge base in the field is small, (see e.g. Acemoglu et. al. 2012; Aghion et.
al. 2014). The pace of innovations is determined by the existing pool of knowledge
and the level of investment in the field (Stiglitz 2013). Research fields with a small
base of knowledge often have a larger developing potential, but the probability of a
successful outcome is smaller. The probability of success is often thought of being
conditional on the aggregate research activity in the field. Because of the involuntary
flow of knowledge the probability of success increases as more innovators enter.
The arguments in favor for additional inducement in the green sector are based
on the impression of an under-investment in environmental R&D due to insufficient
environmental policy. The question is whether innovation prizes are a suited in-
strument to reach the optimal level of R&D. Brennan et. al. (2012) list several
“idosyncratic” advantages, among these are publicity, flexibility, contestant man-
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agement, pre-commitment, and non-patentability. In the following sections I will
discuss to what extent these and other advantages apply to environmental R&D.
4.1 Risk and uncertainty
Any innovator, either for market goods or environmental technology, will front the
many uncertainties that characterize the innovative sector. The innovator will never
know in advance whether the invention will be a commercial success or what value
a patent will bring. Potential patent value depends on future demand which is un-
known to the innovator. For environmental R&D future demand will be determined
by future environmental policy.
The many uncertainties in the developing process affect incentives to innovate.
The innovator must balance the potential return to the probability of failing. If
the innovator is risk averse, the uncertainty will discourage investments. Research
fields characterized by particular high uncertainty will then attract less investments,
resulting in especially little R&D.
The question is whether the risk of investing in environmental R&D is greater
than the risk associated with development of ordinary market goods. If so, incentives
in the green sector is substantially lower than other sectors. Special for environmen-
tal research is the uncertainty about future energy sources, and which that appear
most beneficial to concentrate on.
By participating in a prize contest the expected revenue increases, which in-
creases the incentives to innovate. This re-allocation of risk is a feature that distin-
guishes prizes from patents. The risk shifts from the innovator to the prize funder,
changing expected revenue to the innovator. If risk and uncertainty is particularly
high for green R&D an inducement prize could solve this problem.
4.2 Publicity
The announcement of a prize contest will attract attention and the winner will
receive honor and glory. The advantage of positive publicity and free advertisement
is significant for firms that launch new technologies to the competitive market. The
innovator will always be uncertain about future demand since the market for the
new product does not yet exist. How quickly will the invention diffuse, how fast
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will competing firms copy the technology and when is the product outdated? Most
likely environmentally friendly products are in greater need of this extra publicity
to push adaption, especially if the existing policies do not create sufficient demand
for green R&D.
4.3 Flexibility
The flexibility of prize design is especially an advantage in cases where solution to
a problem is not known. A prize contest can be formulated in several ways and
adjusted to the object of interest.
With prizes the funder is able to manage and arrange competition aiming at a
specific goal. The crucial premise for prizes to be applied is whether the funder
knows the objective. If the objective is unknown ex ante, winning criteria cannot
be specified. In many cases neither the funder nor the private market has enough
information to know what research to induce. In the case of renewable energy,
nobody knows with certainty which energy source will appear most valuable in
the future. However, the funder can avoid specifying the energy source, and rather
demand a renewable energy that gives them a desired energy level and cost ($/kWh).
Characteristic for prizes is the opportunity to widen up or narrow down criteria
adjusted to the research field. This ability to customize makes prizes a flexible
mechanism. Newell and Wilson (2005) discuss design in detail where the narrowness
is an important issue for environmental R&D. “The overarching goal is clear: to slow
or stop the rise of net GHG emissions in order to mitigate the risk of global climate
change” (page 26), but this target would be too broad making the declaration of a
single winner difficult. Instead the prize should be restricted to specific technologies
or particular energy sources with focus on one research area at the time Newell and
Wilson (2005).
4.4 Contestant Management
A prize contest can be designed such that only qualified contestants can participate.
Then the possibility of duplication of effort can be prevented. If two innovators come
up with identical ideas, the effort of one of the innovators was wasteful and should
have been optimally allocated to other research fields. Davis (2004) writes that even
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though diverse innovators have different technologies and methods, duplication may
occur: “Thus they cannot accurately read signal from each other with regards to
investment choices, leading to inefficient investment and duplication of effort, with
the consequent welfare losses” (page 5). Duplication of innovation is equivalent to
unnecessary duplication of cost. The announcement of a prize contest can increase
innovation within a specific field, and the possibility of duplication may increase due
to few innovators with same knowledge base.
To prevent duplication the prize designer can limit entrance. Newell and Wilson
(2005) comment that limiting marginal participants that are unlikely to win might
also eliminate potential winners: “It might also screen out small firms without the
initial capital to compete with larger firms. (...) such small firms have historically
been closely associated with more revolutionary technological developments” (page
36). Davis (2002) comment that the requested solution may appear completely
different from what the prize funder expected. The advantage of such competitions
is to allow both “garage” thinkers, high school classes and high-tech engineers to
enter and trade ideas. “(. . . ) prizes attract the attention of less hidebound thinkers
who are willing to challenge technological orthodoxies” (Newell and Wilson 2005,
page 28). Newell and Wilson further claim the opportunity to encourage any type
of researcher to extend their knowledge is a special advantage of inducement prizes:
“Inducement prizes could trigger an advance in GHG-reducing technologies that
research-subsidizing levers might not have” (page 28). In the field of environmental
research the need for new thoughts and ideas at the cutting edge is significant. Prizes
could be a suitable instrument to induce radical innovations in environmental R&D.
Another prize design to prevent duplication is based on knowledge exchange
between the contestants. Forcing the participants to display their developments in
an early stage of the contest may lead further research in complementary directions
(Davis 2004). This knowledge exchange evolves benefits by pushing the competition
and increasing the quality of the inventions.
Susan Scotchmer (2004) argues that the duplication of cost is not considered a
problem when ideas are scarce: “(...) scarcity means that only one inventor can fill
the market niche defined by his or her idea” (page 45). Scarce ideas are an issue for
environmental R&D. The research field is young and insufficient demand over time
has not provoked the necessary radical invention.
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4.5 Non-patentability
Another fundamental advantage of inducement prizes is the possibility to reward
non-patentable research: “(. . . ) the most striking if not crucial idiosyncratic dif-
ference between prizes and patents is that prizes can be and are employed for all
sorts of achievements” (Brennan et. al. 2012). Ideas and undeveloped concepts are
not patentable. Neither are complex machinery, combining several patented tech-
nologies. The contest can be designed not to request finished products, but rather
induce new thoughts and different approaches to an unsolved problem. For example
the solution to carbon capture and storage would be an intricate technology, not
patentable alone. Without the possibility to patent a new invention the incentives
decrease, and a development is unlikely to happen. In the field of green R&D an
undeveloped invention is not only a loss of profit to the innovator, but a loss of social
welfare to the global society.
Brennan et. al (2012) writes that several circumstances prevent the patent sys-
tem from providing the optimal R&D investment: “For areas that could be char-
acterized as “big science”, areas with significant spillovers (e.g. access to space)
or un-internalized externalities (e.g., climate change abatement), the value that the
innovator is able to appropriate from their intellectual property may not be enough
to overcome R&D costs even if the social welfare gain is large enough to justify the
investment” (page 18). In these cases a prize in combination to the patent system
may encourage firms to invest more in environmental innovation.
4.6 Pre-commitment
Previous arguments from section 5.1 to 5.5 may equally apply for other research
areas than environmental R&D, although they can be interpreted to argue in favor
for green innovation. However, the issue in this section do apply for environmental
R&D in particular and is the fundamental framework of the model in this thesis.
Market for environmental R&D depends crucially on future policies since envi-
ronmental policy creates the demand for green technology. A pollution tax would
affect the innovator’s respond and determine how the innovator sets the license fee2
on the invention. Size of the license fee is crucial for the spread of the innovation, a
2The license fee is the price variable, set by the innovator, that determines how much firms
must pay to adopt the new invention.
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high fee signify expensive technology followed by less adaption. Policies are known
to be unstable as politicians come and go in a democratic process. It is therefore
complicated to commit to a future tax level, or an ongoing subsidizing of input. The
innovator therefore faces uncertainty about future demand, affecting the investment
decision in R&D.
This is referred to as the commitment problem, and has been further analyzed by
Laffont and Tirole (1996) and Greaker and Hoel (2011). The source of the commit-
ment problem is the problem of expropriation. This implies that the government is
tempted to use their regulating power and expropriate rents from the invention. The
government can put a downward pressure on the license fee by force of being major
purchaser, the arbiter of intellectual property rights or assessor. The inventor has
no guarantee the license fee is not pushed below the level that covers her research
costs. Greaker and Hoel (2011) writes “As long as the government cannot commit to
environmental policy several years into the future, the government may thus end up
partly or fully expropriating the rents for pollution abatement innovations” (page
3). The commitment problem contributes to the uncertain surroundings of future
demand.
One can point out several similarities between the market for vaccines and the
market of environmental R&D. Both are public goods, benefiting globally. The
development and diffusion of a good has social value that exceeds the private value
of the innovator. The curse following global public goods is caused by the free-rider
problem. No single country has enough incentives to encourage research since it is
more beneficial to free-ride on the research of others.
This is similar to the market for environmental R&D and applies especially for
climate change. Abatement is a public good and pollution has external effects where
affected agents live in different nations. This gives a transboundary environmental
problem, where the environmental policy of a single government depends on the
actions of all other countries. The market of environmental R&D is often interna-
tional and depends therefore on all governments policies. If the policies are weak,
the value of environmental research decreases and lowers the incentives to invest.
Kremer (2001) divides the different inducement programs in two subgroups,
“push” and “pull”. Programs that push innovation fund research inputs and pull-
programs buy the developed invention. Kremer suggests a system that verifies com-
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mitment, named Advanced Market Commitment (AMC), where the government
commits to purchase a given quantity that meets prespecified criteria. AMC is
defined as a pull program. In the special case of vaccines this would both provide
incentives and ensure that the finished product reaches out to those that need them.
An inducement prize is very similar to AMC, albeit the distributional aspect.
Winner of the prize will keep both the intellectual property rights and the control
of the commercialization. In the case of AMC the innovator keeps the patent, but a
number of doses must be sold at a guaranteed price. Kremer’s results are based on
future uncertainty in demand resulting from governmental policies, similar to the
commitment problem with environmental R&D described in this thesis.
The main advantage of prize contests is the possibility to avoid the commitment
problem. The funder promises the prize in the announcement ex ante where the
prize transfer act as a payment commitment. Risk is reduced with the probability
of winning the prize. Since the field of environmental R&D is especially vulnerable
for unstable politics a prize can decrease uncertainty, and hence increase incentives.
Often, in the case of environmental R&D, the funder is the only interested party
willing to purchase the winning invention. Either because the demanded technology
is specially designed for governmental use, or a private funder wants to contribute to
the spread of knowledge. The inventor seeks the prize to increase expected revenue
and cover research expenditures. An optimal prize should provide a guarantee for
future purchases such that the firm can recoup these costs (Brennan et. al. 2012).
The optimal R&D investment level, from the regulators point of view, would
maximize welfare. The core of the problem is that private investments are not
a decision parameter of the regulator. Investments can therefore only be affected
implicitly through taxes and inducement mechanisms. Requate (2005) finds that
committing to a prespecified tax schedule will dominate all other policy regimes,
eliminating the commitment problem:
(. . . ) early commitment before R&D activity is socially beneficial since
then environmental policy has a stronger impact on R&D effort. How-
ever, the commitment should include a flexible menu of tax rates (permit
quantities) contingent on R&D success (page 194).
In this analysis I will show that a prespecified menu of taxes is not the only instru-
ment that can solve the commitment problem.
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5 Model framework
This analysis investigates how an innovation prize could solve the commitment prob-
lem when the patent system does not restore the optimal level of incentives. The
prize work as a minimum payment commitment. The conditions are announced ex
ante, such that the innovator has full information of what transfer to expect when
entering the competition. This inducement prize is considered to accompany the
patent system, giving the innovator an extra return in case of successful develop-
ment.
The model will be based on the working paper by Greaker and Hoel (2011),
where incentives for environmental R&D are compared to incentives for market
good R&D in a framework of a commitment problem. Their aim is to conduct a
systematical comparison of incentives in a general economic model of innovation. In
the literature on environmental R&D many models are based on special cases with
little or no relation to a reliable general case (Greaker and Hoel 2011).
Greaker and Hoel (2011) find that timing is crucial for how incentives are deter-
mined due to the commitment problem. In this thesis the innovator acts after the
governmental taxation decision. The core of the problem is inconsistent actions of
the government in case of successful development. For a successful innovation the
environmental policy is set before the license fee. The government may be tempted
to set a low tax and expropriate rents from the innovation. As a result the innovator
must undercut the emission tax, and the license fee is driven downwards to uphold
the profitability of adopting the new technology.
When the license fee is low the innovator will not benefit from her research. In
the extreme case of the expropriation argument, illustrated in Laffont and Tirole
(1996), no R&D is performed despite the existence of a patent system. Because the
government set the tax as low as possible level, such that the innovator is forced to
set the license fee to zero.
Greaker and Hoel (2011) question whether the commitment problem creates
systematically lower incentives to environmental R&D. They analyze the appro-
priability problem by comparing private incentives, hence the patent value to the
innovator. In the working paper they presume the regulator willl induce the same
level of private incentives in both R&D cases. However, they show in an unpublished
paper (Greaker and Hoel 2014) that a comparison would also depend on the gain
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in net surplus generated by the innovation. In this thesis I include the effect on net
welfare when modeling the appropriability problem, arguing that this gives a more
proper model of incentives.
The contribution to the literature by this thesis, is the modeling of inducement
prizes. I will take the set up in Greaker and Hoel (2011) as a baseline for the specific
model and analyze how prizes are suited to restore the optimal level of incentives.
The prize is assumed to be a lump sum transfer only rewarded in case of success.
The prize is determined as the difference between private incentives and net welfare
effects of innovation, giving a positive prize if the private incentives is too low.
My findings for a general commitment problem when incorporating net welfare
effects follow the result in Greaker and Hoel (2011). No special ranking of incen-
tives to market good R&D and environmental R&D is possible. I will therefore
further expand the model by including a political disturbance in the environmen-
tal case, implying an extended commitment problem. My analysis aim to compare
the incentives for ordinary market good R&D to environmental R&D with political
disturbance.
6 The political economy of environmental R&D
To model the under-investment in environmental R&D this thesis includes an aspect
of political economy. I assume that pressure groups of organized producer interests
try to restrain the environmental policy. This only applies in the case of environ-
mental R&D, not in the laissez-faire case. I will further assume that the single
innovator and other consumers do not manage to create groups that represent the
interests that could push back.
The government sets a tax on pollution to achieve the target of economically
efficient level of emissions. Efficient level of pollution will maximize social net wel-
fare. In absence of an emission tax the producing firms have no incentive to abate
pollution. An emission tax creates incentives to reduce pollution in form of tax
avoidance and investments in environmental R&D. Taxation reduces the profits of
the producing firms, it is profitable to abate as long as marginal abatement cost is
less than the tax rate per unit of pollution.
Private incentives of the producing firms may conflict the optimality criteria
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of welfare economics. Moreover, members of the producing industry have special
interests in not following the goal of the welfare maximizing government. As a result
interest groups are established and these groups find it rational trying to influence
the political decision, instead of passively adopting the decisions of the political
system.
In the model, the polluting industry contains of many small firms, together
constituting a large competitive sector. Every single firm takes the market price
and governmental decisions as given. This condition of perfect competition breaks
if firms manage to organize and participate in the political process. Sandmo (2000)
discusses how interest groups are established in a model of environmental economics:
(. . . ) it is natural to assume that the owners of ‘dirty’ industries are
likely to be against attempts by the government to impose special taxes
or regulations on them, and they will therefore be motivated to spend
resources on attempts to make the government deviate form a policy of
pure welfare maximization (Sandmo 2000, page 146).
I assume the pressure groups manage to influence the tax decision since the gov-
ernment suffers from “weakness of will”, but there are other potential explanations.
The parties in the government could crave for re-election, and groups are willing to
pay for campaign-contributions. The benevolent government must balance between
protection of firms and welfare maximization when setting the emission tax.
Olson (1971) establishes a theory of collective actions, and explains how the
interests of an organized and concentrated minority may trump the interests of a
majority due to the free-rider problem. Olson argues that the existence of “selective
incentives” in a group is the crucial factor that motivates and succeeds collective
actions. A large group of people with common interests is not enough to achieve
collective actions. The participants miss the concentrated incentives that bind them
together. Without selective incentives participants in a group are likely to free ride
on the effort of others, and the group becomes less able to succeed. Olson put
forward the argument that costs of organizing group actions increase in group size
and that gain from successful actions is less per participant in large groups.
The theory by Olson applies to the model in this thesis if we assume the majority
of society have a diffuse environmental awareness and there is a tightly organized
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producing sector. The large group of environmentalists lacks the concentrated in-
centive to push lobbyism back by demanding a stricter environmental policy. Small
firms have the selective incentives to reduce taxes, and are therefor able to influence
the government in the decisive moment.
To extend the commitment problem I will both consider a planner not able to
precommit to a tax such that inducement on R&D is not fully reflected. Secondly,
the commitment problem is extended with a political aspect where the government3
is relented by interest groups. The welfare maximizing government does not manage
to set the optimal policy due to some political disturbance. The planner knows the
optimal level of incentives she wishes to induce, but by the time the tax is to be set
the interest groups influence the decision and the planner is not strong enough to
resist. The benevolent planner suffers from “weakness of will”, such that an extra
weight is set on the producers’ profit in the objective.
The result of including an aspect of political economy and lobbyism is a situation
where incentives to environmental R&D is low due to a weak environmental policy,
hence a low tax on emission followed by a low license fee. Neither the optimal
abatement level nor the optimal R&D level is achieved. I will investigate how
an inducement prize could restore the optimal level of incentives in these type of
situations.
The model includes an application from Bommer and Schultze (1999), where the
government sets the environmental policy as a political trade-off among different
interest groups. The political support function from Bommer and Schulze will in this
analysis be interpreted as a weighted average, where the profit of the downstream
sector is weighted with a significant share in the object function. Bommer and
Schultze contribute to the canon of positive political economy, by discussing why
and how politicians objective is formed. However, this analysis contributes with
a normative perspective where we start out with a welfare function and see how
political disturbance makes the realized welfare deviate from a first best outcome.
The analysis is organized as followed: First the general set up and the timing
of each R&D case will be explained and illustrated. Then a numerical example is
introduced specifying the functional forms in each R&D case. At last I will clarify
how a prize could solve an extended commitment problem.
3A welfare maximizing government and a benevolent social planner will be interpreted as equiv-
alent in this analysis and used as synonyms.
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7 The model
Consider a model with a single innovator and a continuum of several downstream
firms. The model is divided into two different R&D scenarios. One sector produces
a normal market good with no regulations, the laissez-fair scenario. The other sector
has “dirty” industry regulated with an emission tax by a benevolent planner. As
in Greaker and Hoel (2011), I let the (i) market good R&D output (x) denote the
aggregate production of a market good. For (ii) environmental R&D the output (x)
refer to total abatement for both the old and the new technology (Greaker and Hoel
2011).
For both cases of R&D the old technology is supplied by the downstream sector,
while the innovator supplies new technology in exchange for a payment, the license
fee. The formal model has a similar setup as in Laffont and Tirole (1996) with a
single innovator. I follow their assumption that more R&D increases the probability
of successful innovation (z). In my model the outcome of the inventive process (α)
is determined by nature4. Hence, the innovator can influence the probability with
her investment level but not the output of the innovation process.
The assumption of a single innovator corresponds to the monopoly power the
innovator achieves through the patent system. A patent discloses the knowledge base
underlying the innovation that could have been used by rivals to develop substituting
technologies (Gerlagh et al 2009). Since patents rule out potential competition, an
assumption of only one innovator seems reasonable.
The simplification of a single innovator in the research process before achieved
patent can be questioned. This assumption rules out the effects from patent races,
where two or more innovators compete to first obtain the patent rights. To justify
this simplification we assume that the outcome of a patent race would have been
equal for both cases of R&D. Only the comparison of the two R&D cases are inter-
esting for this analysis, and therefore it is redundant to include a stage with several
innovators ax ante.
The sequences of environmental R&D is illustrated in figure 1, where a pollutive
downstream sector demand abatement technology. The sequence begin with the
announcement of the prize (P ) ex ante, followed by the investment decision of the
4This is the same as in Laffont and Tirole (1996), but their α is fixed and in this thesis I vary
α to generalize the model of the innovation process.
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Figure 1: The progress of environmental R&D with a benevolent planner
innovator. The innovator maximize the probability of successful innovation (z)
subjected to her expected profit (pi). Her decision variable is the investment level
(I). The innovation process is assumed to be uncertain, and the sequence is therefore
divided into two potential outcomes. One path of successful development followed
by winning the positive prize (P > 0), and one path where the innovation process
fails and no prize is rewarded (P = 0).
The benevolent planner maximizes social welfare and sets an emission tax to
reach the pollution target. The target should be the economically efficient level
of pollution where aggregated marginal cost of abatement equals the aggregated
marginal benefit from abatement. The output variable (x) denotes total abatement.
The planner takes into account whether the innovation process was a success and
the tax will therefore differ in the two paths, (t and t¯).
Environmental policy will determine incentives to R&D, but due to the commit-
ment problem and the appropriability problem the level of incentives would not be
optimal without a prize. In case of success the innovator sets the license fee (`) on
her innovation by maximizing the patent value (v). The downstream firms decide
whether to purchase the new invention due to their private marginal abatement
cost. The realized outcome in case of success is the welfare surplus (WE(x)), and
the patent value (vE(x, t)) as a function of abatement and the tax level. However,
in the case of no innovation5 the planner max welfare subjected to the tax (t¯). Only
the welfare surplus is realized (W¯E) since no patent is issued.
In the case of market good R&D there is no other governmental intervention
than the announcement of the prize competition at the beginning of the game. For
5Notice the notation with an upper bar will denote the no innovation outcome scenarios for all
R&D cases in the analysis
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Figure 2: The progress of market good R&D, the laissez-faire scenario
the sector of market goods the new technology is a type of manufacture improve-
ment that decreases production costs. The downstream sector produces a quantum
denoted (x). The sector is defined as an industry with no need for governmental
interference and is therefore interpreted as the laissez-faire scenario. Since the stages
of taxation is omitted, there is no commitment problem in this case.
Following the illustration in figure 2 we see how this case differs from the environ-
mental R&D case. The prize (P ) is announced ex ante followed by the innovator’s
investment decision (z). In case of no innovation the sequence ends with the realized
social surplus (W¯M(x)). On the other hand, in case of success the innovator sets the
license fee (`) followed by the downstream sector adoption decision. The realized
outcome is the welfare surplus (WM(x)) and the patent value (vM(x)). Note that
the patent value is not a function of the tax in the laissez-faire case. R&D for mar-
ket goods is underprovided due to the appropriability problem such that the welfare
outcome is not optimal without a prize.
7.1 Decision of the innovator
Market good R&D and environmental R&D has the same point of departure where
the innovator maximizes expected return, pi(z), by investing in R&D. The innova-
tor decides her investment level (I) and will then also determine the probability of
success (z). The decision is based on the innovator’s incentives created by expected
payoff. In both cases of R&D the expected return is what the patent allows the
innovator to charge for the innovation and the prize transfer. The patent value is
determined by commercial success and the demand for the new technology. In this
model the quality output of an innovation is taken as given, and we are only inter-
ested in the choice variable of the innovator: the probability of success determined
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by investments.
Total payment to the innovator (v) is given by a revenue function that depends
on the license fee (`) and aggregated output or abatement units (x). The revenue is
also determined by the exogenous output of the innovation process (α):
v = v(x, `;α) (1)
For the revenue function I follow Greaker and Hoel in assuming that a zero price or
zero output would give zero revenue, v(x, 0) = v(0, `) = 0. It is also reasonable to
assume that use of the new technology is increasing in output, dv
dx
> 0. I assume that
for small values of ` the revenue increases, but for high fees the revenue decrease
since less firms can afford the new technology. The patent return will also increase
the better innovation given by the exogenous process, dv
dα
< 0.
The probability of success is denoted z, which can be interpreted as a function
of the investment level, z(I). The probability increases as the innovator increases
her investments, such that z′(I) > 0 and limI→∞ z(I) = 1, but at a diminishing rate
as the probability approaches one, z′′(I) < 0. The maximization problem of the
innovator in case of success becomes:
max
z
pi(z(I)) = z(I)
(
v(x, `;α) + P
)− I (2)
where v(x, `;α) denotes the patent value and P > 0 is the inducement prize set by
the government. The cost of investing is denoted I. In case of failure the revenue
becomes negative due to sunk investment costs, p¯i(z) = −I. The license fee and the
patent value is then automatically set to zero and the prize is not rewarded (P = 0).
The probability is multiplied with the patent value and the prize, such that
increased investments increase returns. The first order condition gives the private
optimal level of incentives, z:
v(x, `;α) + P = (z′)−1 (3)
where the private gain from R&D equals the marginal investment cost, giving the
optimal level of investments I∗. Note that private gain is not equal to total social
gain from the invention. The solution is given by z′(v, P, I)−1, where the probability
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is a function of the patent value, the prize and the investment level. The probability
is increasing in all terms, dz
dv
> 0, dz
dP
> 0 and dz
dI
> 0.
7.2 The downstream sector
The cost function of the downstream sector differs in the two potential outcomes of
the R&D process. In case of success the license fee influences the spread of the new
technology implying that the cost function C depends on `, such that C = C(x, `).
Since a higher fee imply either unchanged or less use of the new technology, I follow
Greaker and Hoel (2001) and assume C` ≥ 0. Following standard assumptions
the cost function is convex and increasing in output such that Cx(x, `) > 0 and
Cxx(x, `) > 0.
However, in the case of no innovation the innovator is not present in the rest of
the sequence. The cost function modifies to C¯(x), where C¯ ′(x) > 0 and C¯ ′′(x) > 0.
When a new technology is successfully invented the total cost of the downstream
sector consists of payment to the innovator and production/abatement costs. In
aggregated terms the total payment to the innovator is the revenue function, v =
v(x, `;α). Usage of the new technology increases the return to the innovator such
that vx(x, `;α) > 0. Installation or adaption cost is not considered in this model.
Total private cost in the downstream in case of success becomes:
C(x, `) + vi(x, `;α) i = M,E,E(Ω) (4)
where M denotes the market good R&D, E denotes environmental R&D with a
benevolent planner and E(Ω) denotes environmental R&D with lobbyism.
Note that in case of success the private cost (C+v) is not equivalent to the social
cost (C). The payment to the innovator makes this distinction, creating a market
failure with a following welfare loss.
7.3 Specifying functional forms
To derive the outcomes of the different R&D cases we need an example with specific
functional forms. The functions used in this example follow standard microeconomic
theory. The simplest way to illustrate the example is with linear marginal curves.
I will follow the specific functions used in the example of Greaker and Hoel
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(2011). The functions are derived from a sector where each firm produces one unit
at different cost. The functions emerges when lining up all firms such that the cost
function is increasing in numbers of firms.
The new technology will not be beneficial for all producing firms. We let xˆ denote
the threshold level for innovation adaption where x denotes the marginal firm. For
firms below the threshold, x < xˆ, the revenue to the innovator is v = 0, positive
revenue is only obtained for the marginal firm on the threshold and those above,
x ≥ xˆ. The revenue function (1) can then be given a specific form, following from
Greaker and Hoel (2011):
v(x, `;α) = `[x− xˆ] (5)
where the license fee is multiplied with total adaption of the new technology. For
high fees the revenue increases, but at a dimishing rate since less firms are above
the threshold, (x ≥ xˆ).
The innovator can develop a new technology denoted α, where the quality α ∈
(0, 1) is exogenous. The innovation has higher quality and is more radical whenever
α→ 0. For environmental R&D this would signify an increased cleaning potential,
and for market good R&D the cost of producing one unit decreases, αx→ 0. If the
R&D process fails, then no improvement is achieved α = 1 and automatically the
license fee becomes ` = 0.
The aggregated social cost function in the case of success is derived from the
area beneath the cost curve:
C(x, `) =
∫ xˆ
0
sds+
∫ x
xˆ
αsds =
(1− α)xˆ2
2
+
αx2
2
(6)
The marginal social cost of output becomes Cx(x, `) = αx. The value of xˆ is derived
in equation (8), giving a specific expression of the cost function in case of success.
If the innovation process fails there exist no threshold, such that xˆ = x. Then by
inserting this into (6) we can derive the social cost function in case of no innovation:
C¯(x) =
x2
2
(7)
where the marginal cost is linear, given by C¯ ′(x) = x. Note that marginal cost
for firms below the threshold in case of success equals the marginal cost in the no
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Figure 3: The threshold level of innovation adaption
innovation state, Cx(x, 0) + vx(x, 0) = C¯
′(x). For those firms choosing not to adopt
the new technology nothing changes relative to the no innovation outcome.
Firms above the threshold will purchase the new invention, and those below
hold on to their old technology. Those producing firms that keep the old technology
have private marginal cost Cx(x, 0) + vx(x, 0) = x, and those firms that purchase
the new technology have the private marginal cost Cx(x, `) + vx(x, `) = ` + αx.
The equilibrium is illustrated in figure 3, where we see how the new cost curve has
reduced slope and a higher intercept after adaption. From the intersection we can
derive the threshold level of technology adaption:
xˆ =
`
(1− α) (8)
By inserting (8) into (6) we can derive the expression of the social cost function in
case of success:
C(x, `) =
`2
2(1− α) +
αx2
2
(9)
When inserting (8) into (5) we get the expression for the revenue function:
v(x, `;α) = `
[
x− `
(1− α)
]
(10)
which is concave in ` and increasing in x such that the conditions suggested for (1)
in the general model holds. The revenue to the innovator will differ in the three
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cases of R&D depending on the specific level of x and ` in each case.
Note the difference between the social cost function (6) and the private cost
function given by (4). From (10) the private cost function can be given a specific
expression:
C(x, `) + v(x, `;α) =
αx2
2
+ `
[
x− `
2(1− α)
]
(11)
Social benefits from (i) produced output or (ii) pollution abatement is given by:
B(x) = Bx− βx
2
2
(12)
such that the linear part dominates the quadratic and the standard properties holds,
B′(x) > 0 and B′′ ≤ 0. Where β denotes the slope of the benefit curve. For the
results in this analysis to hold I have added the restriction β ≥ 0. If β = 0 the
marginal benefit curve is a constant flat line equal to B. The lower β the more
society benefits from (i) producing the market good or (ii) reducing pollution, the
steeper is the social benefit curve. B could have been normalized to one without
loss of generality.
If no invention is developed the welfare outcome is given by the difference between
social benefit of production and the social cost:
W¯ i(x) = B(x)− C¯(x) i = M,E,E(Ω) (13)
For a explicit expression we insert equation (12) and (7) into (13) and derive the
welfare outcome when the innovative process fails:
W¯ i(x) = Bx− x
2
2
(1 + β) i = M,E,E(Ω) (14)
In the case of successful development the realized welfare is derived with the im-
proved social cost function including the cost of adopting the new technology and
the improvement of the production. The potential outcome is denoted:
W i(x, `) = B(x)− C(x, `) i = M,E,E(Ω) (15)
Notice that the benefits is independent of the innovative process, i.e. B(x) is un-
changed for the two potential outcomes (13) and (15).
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For a specific expression of realized welfare we insert (12) and (9) into (15). The
welfare outcome for successful innovation becomes a function of x and `:
W i(x, `) = Bx− x
2
2
(β + α)− `
2
2(1− α) i = M,E,E(Ω) (16)
The further analysis will compare the different types of R&D to analyze in what
means they differ. For environmental R&D the analysis is divided into two subsec-
tions, one case with a benevolent government (E) and one scenario with extended
commitment problem due to lobbyism (E(Ω)). All cases consist of several sequences,
such that they should be solved by backward induction. The “games” are strategic,
where the “players” take into account the future actions of the other “players” when
deciding their best response.
7.4 Net welfare
With the two potential outcomes, W i and W¯ i, in each of the three R&D cases we
can derive the realized gain as the net welfare surplus:
∆W i = W i(xi, `i)− W¯ i, i = M,E,E(Ω) (17)
From this we define ∆W as the increase in net welfare. With a fee on the technol-
ogy the invention will be adapted less than optimal since cost increases, C(x, `) >
C(x, 0). Full gain from an innovation is only obtained if the license fee is set to zero.
The definition of net welfare is this thesis’ contribution to the investigation of
incentives and a distinction from the model in Greaker and Hoel (2011)
7.5 Maximum net welfare
Figure 4 illustrates the welfare losses appearing from innovator’s monopoly power.
Realized output is x and output level in case of no innovation is denoted by x¯. The
two triangular losses are marked with bold lines. Realized net welfare is the area
between the losses, marked with grey.
The loss to the left is created by those firms not adapting the new technology
since their marginal cost is lower than the threshold (x < xˆ). It is more beneficial
for these firms to keep their old technology. The second loss to the right comes from
30
Figure 4: The deadweight losses in the market of R&D
the fact that a positive license fee do not restore the optimal quantum of output.
The private cost of adaption is not equal to the social cost of adaption, (x < x∗).
The loss would diminish if more (i) output or (ii) abatement was achieved, but
that would only follow from a lower license fee. With a license fee equal to zero
the marginal private cost curve would coincide with the marginal social cost curve.
However, with a zero license fee the innovator achieves no revenue from her research,
v(x, 0) = 0 and hence the private incentives decrease. This is the crucial trade off
in the appropriability problem.
Figure 4 can be interpreted for all cases of R&D. For the environmental case
the figure measures units of abatement on the horizontal axis and price of pollution
abatement on the vertical axis. When abatement is zero, the maximum level of
emissions is realized. Interpretation is the same for market good R&D with the
only difference that produced quantum is measured on the horizontal axis and no
governmental interference is applied to reduce the losses. We see from the graph
that more abatement/output is achieved the better technology, since the marginal
cost curve becomes less steep as α→ 0.
To be able to compare the three cases of R&D we need a common benchmark.
Defining the maximal net welfare surplus that is obtained when ` = 0 we have a
equal measure for all three cases. We denote the maximum net welfare as:
∆W ∗ = W ∗ − W¯ where ` = 0 (18)
31
Figure 5: Maximum net welfare
In figure 5 the triangular area marked grey represents the maximum net welfare.
The mission of the benevolent planner is to minimize any deadweight loss in the three
cases of R&D such that the realized net welfare, ∆W i come as close to maximal
∆W ∗ as feasible. The optimal output level in case of successful development and a
zero license fee is denoted by x∗.
Deriving an expression for the maximal net surplus in case of success we use the
social benefit function (12) and the social cost function (4) where ` = 0 and insert
these two into (15):
W ∗ = Bx∗ − (β + α)
2
(x∗)2 (19)
The equilibrium condition is the intersection of marginal benefit and marginal cost
Cx(x, o) curves, B − βx = αx. Solving for x gives the socially optimal level of
output:
x∗ =
B
(α + β)
(20)
Inserting (20) into (19) gives the realized max surplus in case of success:
W ∗ =
B2
2(α + β)
(21)
In case of no innovation the equilibrium is given by B′(x) = C¯ ′(x), i.e. B− βx = x,
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giving the no innovation outcome;
x¯M =
B
(1 + β)
(22)
By inserting (22) into (14) we can derive the realized surplus in case of no innovation:
W¯ =
B2
2(1 + β)
(23)
Since ∆W ∗ is a common benchmark for all R&D cases, it must follow that W¯ also
equalize across cases, giving the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The welfare level in the no innovation state is equal for environ-
mental R&D with a benevolent planner and market good R&D, W¯ = W¯E = W¯M .
From these two potential outcomes (21) and (23) we can derive maximal net welfare:
∆W ∗ =
B2
2
(1− α)
(α + β)(1 + β)
(24)
The maximum net welfare will never be realized because the patent rights allows
the innovator to charge a positive fee. It is the monopoly power introduced by the
patent system that destroys the chance of restoring the maximum net welfare.
One approach to force realization of the optimal quantum is to set a tax equal to
the intersection of marginal cost and marginal benefit. Since the innovator sets the
license fee after governmental policy, the innovator seizes the opportunity to set a
high license fee, resulting in a deadweight loss. If the government set the tax lower
such that the license fee decreases, less incentives to invest in R&D is created.
7.6 The commitment problem
Consider a state of no innovation that we have denoted W¯ , without the cost of the
innovation sector such that W¯ = B(x)−C(x). The optimal emission tax set by the
government from the desired maximization problem:
max
z
{z(I)W (x, `) + (1− z(I))W¯ − I} (25)
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The first order condition of this maximization problem with respect to the optimal
investment, where the notation is simplified by ∆W = W − W¯ , would give:
∆W − (z′)−1 = 0 (26)
From the first order condition of expected revenue to the innovator, equation (3),
we know that v(x, `) + P = (z′)−1, giving the condition:
∆W = (z′)−1 = v(x, `) + P (27)
The governmental commitment problem is an issue if the social value of the innova-
tion exceeds the private patent value to the innovator, such that ∆W > v(x, `). My
research question is to investigate whether the difference ∆WE − vE(x, `) is larger
than ∆WM − vM(x, `). The appropriability problem makes the innovator unable
to collect all private gain from her invention, and therefore the first order condition
(26) does not hold. If the government could set a prize such that P = ∆W −v(x, `).
Then P > 0 and the commitment problem would be solved and the government
achieves the optimal investment level. This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2 An innovation prize, defined as P i = ∆W i − vi, would yield the
optimal investment level I* and solve the commitment problem.
This proposition defines the inducement prizes that is this thesis’s contribution to
the literature on innovation. As far as I know no article has yet modeled these type
of prizes in a general model of incentives.
8 Market good R&D
R&D of ordinary market goods represent a laissez-faire case, free of governmental
intervention.
8.1 Successful innovation
In case of success the market cross changes with the new cost curve, C(x, `). The
market price will equalize marginal social benefit with aggregated marginal private
cost of production such that B′(x) = p = Cx + vx. Applying (12) and (4), this gives
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the relation B − βx = αx+ `, from which we can solve for produced quantum as a
function of the license fee:
xM(`) =
B − `
(α + β)
(28)
The innovator will set the license fee directly after the success since there is no inter-
vention of the government. The innovator does only benefit from those firms above
the threshold (xˆ), those that adopt the new technology. From the threshold level
(8) and the output quantum (28) the expression of the patent value (10) becomes:
vM(`) = `
[B(1− α)− `(1 + β)
(α + β)(1− α)
]
(29)
The patent value holds the properties from the general case (1). The innovator max-
imizes the return of the patent (29) and the first order condition gives an expression
for the license fee:
`M =
B(1− α)
2(1 + β)
(30)
When inserting (30) into (28) we have achieved an expression for xM :
xM =
B(1 + α + 2β)
2(α + β)(1 + β)
(31)
Produced quantum increases the better innovation dx
dα
< 0, and decreases the less
social benefit the product gives dx
dβ
< 0.
By inserting (30) and (31) into (29), we have an expression of vM :
vM =
B2(1− α)
4(α + β)(1 + β)
(32)
When inserting (30) and (28) into (16) we find an expression for realized welfare in
case of successful innovation:
WM =
B2
8
(3 + α + 4β)
(α + β)(1 + β)
(33)
8.2 Net surplus
If no invention is developed the welfare outcome is given by (14). Realized welfare
in the no innovation state is given by (23) from proposition 1. With the potential
outcome of the two scenarios, we can derive the increase in net surplus, ∆WM =
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WM − W¯M for the case of market good R&D:
∆WM =
B2
8
3(1− α)
(α + β)(1 + β)
(34)
Comparing (20) to (22) and (31) gives the ranking of output illustrated in figure 4.
Proposition 3 Output in the no innovation state is lower than output for successful
innovation, but none reach the social optimal level of output, x¯ < xM < x∗, and by
transitivity it follows that x¯ < x∗.
Proof.
Consider x¯ > xM , then by rearranging it follows that 0 > (1 − α)(1 + 2α). From
the restriction α ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 > (1 − α) never holds, contradicting the
statement and implying that x¯ < xM .
Consider xM > x∗ then by rearranging it follows that (1 + α) > 2. From the re-
striction α ∈ (0, 1) we know that this never holds, and therefore by contradiction it
implies that xM < x∗.
By transitivity it follows that x¯ < x∗. This holds as long as 1
(1+β)
< 1
(α+β)
that imply
α < 1, supported by the restriction α ∈ (0, 1).
We see from this proposition that the patent system prevents realized output in
both scenarios (x¯) and (xM) to reach the social optimum level. The social optima
would only be realized if the successful innovation was spread free of charge.
Comparing the net welfare for market good R&D (34) with the maximum net
surplus (24) we see that the realized welfare falls short for the maximum value. This
follows from the monopoly power the innovator achieves from the patent rights.
Since the license fee is set to larger than zero some downstream firms choose not
to adopt the new technology and a deadweight loss is created. For less radical
inventions (α→ 1), the difference in net welfare, ∆WM −∆WE < 0 diminishes.
Proposition 4 The realized welfare in the case of market good R&D is less than
maximal net welfare, ∆WM < ∆W ∗ due to intellectual property rights.
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9 Environmental R&D with a benevolent planner
The case of environmental R&D involves more uncertainty for the innovator. At
the time the innovator decides her investment the future tax level is unknown,
the uncertainty is followed by what fee she can charge. The planner sets the tax
strategical, considering the license fee the innovator sets as best response.
In this section we interpret the output (x) as units of abatement. The equilib-
rium output level is given by the objective of the benevolent planner, maximizing
welfare with respect to the emission tax. The no-innovation case and the successful
innovation case is analyzed respectively.
9.1 No innovation
When the outcome of the R&D process fails it implies that α = 1. The market
adjusts such that private cost equals the tax on the margin, implying that the
abatement level becomes equal the emission tax::
t¯E = C¯ ′(x) = x¯E (35)
In the case of no-innovation the government maximizes (13) subjected to (35). The
no-innovation tax level t¯E is derived from the first order condition. The policy
is set such that marginal benefits from abatement equals marginal social cost of
abatement: (
B′(x)− C¯ ′(x))dx
dt
= 0 (36)
Rearranging with respect to the tax we can derive an expression for the tax level:
t¯E =
B
(1 + β)
= x¯E (37)
From (37) we see that the abatement level in the no innovation case is equal to the
quantum in the no innovation case for market good R&D, x¯E = x¯M . By inserting
(37) into the welfare function (14) we get realized welfare (23), as already stated
when discussing the benchmark. Then we have proven that proposition 1 holds for
the environmental R&D case.
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9.2 Successful innovation
Taxation makes the production sector less profitable, creating demand for environ-
mental R&D. This encourages the innovator to invest in R&D and to supply green
technology to meet the request. In the downstream sector the private abatement
cost (4) is adjusted such that it equals the tax on the margin:
tE = Cx(x, `) + vx(x, `;α) (38)
The patent allows the innovator to set a positive price on the invention. For a
positive license fee, ` > 0 it is costly to adapt the invention. The higher license fee
less abatement is be achieved.
With respect to the tax the innovator set the license fee by maximizing returns:
max
`
v(x(t, `), `(t);α) (39)
The response function of the innovator is then denoted `(t), where the innovator
can charge a higher fee the stricter policy, d`
dt
> 0.
From these equations the realized level of abatement x = x(t, `) can be derived.
Downstream firms consider whether it is profitable to buy the new technology due
to their individual abatement cost, the tax and the license fee. By purchasing the
new technology the producing firms can decrease emissions and avoid the tax, this
would only be profitable if ` ≤ tE.
When deriving specific expressions the abatement level will be determined from
the equilibrium adjustment condition (38). The downstream sector adjust their
marginal private abatement cost to be equal the emission tax, this gives t = αx+ `.
From this equilibrium condition we can derive the the abatement level:
xE(t, `) =
t− `
α
(40)
The innovator incorporates the abatement level (40) into her expected revenue such
that the patent value (10) becomes:
vE(t, `;α) = `
[(1− α)t− `
α(1− α)
]
(41)
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By maximizing the patent value we derive the innovator’s best response function:
`E(tE) =
(1− α)tE
2
(42)
The license fee becomes a function of the tax. We can further determine the abate-
ment level as a function of the tax by inserting (42) into (40):
xE(tE) =
(1 + α)tE
2α
(43)
The social planner has full information about the R&D outcome and knows whether
the development was successful. The tax setting would implicitly yield the abate-
ment level through governmental maximization.
The benevolent planner sets the emission tax by maximizing social welfare (15)
subjected to (43). The first order condition of (15) gives the optimal emission tax
equation: (
B′(x)− Cx
)dx
dt
− C`d`
dt
= 0 (44)
We see from equation (44) how the tax level differs in the diverse outcomes of
the R&D process, t¯E 6= tE. Since the planner encompasses the development of a
new innovation when setting the environmental policy, the tax becomes a strategic
parameter that depends on the outcome of the innovative process.
The last term in (44) is negative, since a higher tax will increase the license
fee, following the best response of the innovator. The last term ensures that the
first best condition is not satisfied, where marginal benefits form abatement should
equal marginal abatement cost. Instead, since the benefits of pollution reduction is
increasing at a diminishing rate, the first term must be positive such that marginal
benefits exceed the marginal cost in order of the first order condition to hold, B′(x) >
Cx. The last term reflects in what manner the planner considers how the tax affects
the license fee. If the tax is high the license fee will follow and the new technology
becomes expensive. A deadweight loss is created through mark-up pricing by the
monopolistic innovator.
Proposition 5 The optimal tax balances two existing deadweight losses: Too little
abatement is carried out and the tax prevents the license fee from becoming too high.
This illustrates the commitment problem. Policies are not consistent with the inno-
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vation process as policies change relative to the outcome. The first order condition
(44) clarifies the two market failures the tax is intended to correct for. The first
term is pollution abatement correction, and the last term is deadweight loss from
monopoly pricing.
When maximizing (16) subjected to (43) and (42) we can derive an expression
for the tax level:
tE =
B2α(1 + α)
β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α)
(45)
To derive the realized social welfare level in the state of successful innovation we
insert (45) into the objective (16):
WE =
B2
2
(1 + α)2
β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α)
(46)
When we have derived the tax level we can insert (45) into (43) and find an explicit
expression for the abatement level:
xE =
B(1 + α)2
β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α)
(47)
From expression (47) we see that more abatement is accomplished in presence of a
new technology, compared to (22).
Proposition 6 More abatement is achieved when an innovation has been success-
fully developed, x¯ < xE
Proof. Consider x¯ > xE then by rearranging (37) and (47) it follows that 0 >
(1 + 2α)(1 − α). From the restriction α ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 ≥ (1 − α) never
holds. This implies by contradiction that x¯ < xE.
From proposition 9.2 we see that R&D rise the abatement level, but it does not
reach the social optimal level (x∗) because too few firms adopt the new invention.
Proposition 7 The abatement level in case of successful innovation is not social
optimal due to a positive license fee, xE < x∗
Proof. Consider xE > x∗ then by rearranging (20) and (47) it follows that 0 >
α2(1 − α). From the restriction α ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 ≥ (1 − α) never holds.
This implies by contradiction that xE < x∗ .
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Successful innovation and the increase in abatement is accompanied by a dead-
weight loss created by patent rights. Comparing the abatement levels alone does
not give any indication about welfare effects. Therefore we need a comparison of
the two potential welfare outcomes.
The patent value in the case with a benevolent planner is derived by inserting
(45) into (82):
vE =
B2(1− α)α(1 + α)2
(β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(48)
When inserting (45) into (42) we can derive the an expression for the license fee:
`E =
Bα(1 + α)(1− α)
β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α)
(49)
Comparison with (30) depends on the combinations of β and α, and no specific
ranking of the two license fees is possible. For a higher license fee the intercept of
the new cost function is higher (Figure 4), followed by an increased deadweight loss.
Giving an outcome further away from the maximal net surplus, ∆W ∗.
9.3 Net surplus
From (46) and (23) we can derive the net surplus, ∆WE = WE − W¯E:
∆WE =
B2
2
1 + α− 2α2
(β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))(1 + β)
(50)
We see from this expression that realized net welfare do not reach potential maxi-
mum net surplus ∆W ∗, the limiting cases gives:
lim
α→0
∆WE = ∆W ∗ =
B2
2β(1 + β)
(51)
lim
α→1
∆WE = ∆W ∗ = 0 (52)
These limits illustrate that net welfare in the case of environmental R&D never
reaches the maximal net welfare level, since α 6= 0 and α 6= 1.
Proposition 8 The realized welfare in the case of environmental R&D with a benev-
olent planner will always be less than maximal net welfare, ∆WE < ∆W ∗, due to
intellectual property rights and insufficient policies.
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This follows from the two market failures present in this case: the environmental
externality and the patent monopoly power. The benevolent planner has only one
instrument to correct for these to failures, the emission tax, and is therefore falling
short in his mission to max welfare.
10 Environmental R&D with lobbyism
In this section the benevolent social planner suffers from “weakness of will” such
that planners objective is not equivalent to the realized welfare functions (15) and
(13). The objective is influenced by interest groups from the downstream sector
trying to protect their private profit. When introducing private interests we need
to extend the model such that the downstream sector produce both a profitable
product, denoted q, and abatement denoted x.
By including the aspect of lobbyism the tax decrease and incentives to invest in
environmental R&D becomes significantly lower. The social planner misses the tar-
get. But, on the other hand, a low tax is followed by a lower license fee contributing
to the diffusion of the innovation. The interesting aspect is which effect dominates
the other, the net welfare or the patent revenue to the innovator. This determines
the effect on incentives.
The planner’s objective is modeled as a weighted average, where ρ denotes the
lobby parameter, ρ ∈ (0, 1). For low values of ρ the interest groups have more impact
on the governmental decision and the planner puts less weight on social benefits.
The lobby parameter expresses the trade-off with the pressure groups.
I assume that the cost of producing the product q is independent of abatement
cost. The private profit function in case of innovation is denoted:
Ω(q, x, `) = Ω(q)− C(x, `) (53)
However, if no innovation is developed the private profit function becomes:
Ω¯(q, x) = Ω(q)− C¯(x) (54)
Where the revenue for the profitable product is given by Ω(q) = pq − c(q) and is
unchanged in the two potential outcomes, independent of x and `. Note that the
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cost of abatement is independent of production cost, C(q). This follows from the
assumption that the new technology only affects costs and not production methods.
The emission tax is set on the level of abatement and not on produced outcome.
Therefore only the last term, the cost of abatement are affected by the taxation and
relevant for the analysis.
10.1 No innovation
In the case of no innovation the governmental objective becomes:
max
t
G¯Ω(x(t), q) = ρB(x(t)) + (1− ρ)Ω(q)− C¯(x(t)) (55)
We see that the planner puts full weight on abatement cost, and weight the benefit
of abatement with the lobby parameter such that benefits are less prioritized in
presence of lobbyism.
The first order condition, with some rearranging is given by:
(
B′(x)− C¯x
)dx
dt
− (1− ρ)
ρ
C¯x
dx
dt
= 0 (56)
This condition can easily be compared to (36) in the case with a benevolent planner.
We see that the additional negative term decreases the tax level relative to the case
with a benevolent planner.
The private adjustment condition for the downstream sector becomes:
t¯Ω = C¯ ′(x) = x¯Ω (57)
We insert (57) into C¯(x) to derive an expression for the profit function of the down-
stream sector (54) as a function of the tax:
Ω¯(q, t) = Ω(q)− 1
2
(tΩ)2 (58)
The planner maximize (55) subjected to (57), (58), (7) and (12). The first order
condition gives the tax level in the no innovation state:
t¯Ω =
B
1/ρ+ β
(59)
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We see from this expression that the presence of the lobby parameter gives a negative
shift in the tax level. The significance depends on the magnitude of the parameter,
the smaller value the lower becomes the tax. When the pressure groups are weak,
ρ→ 1, the tax approaches the tax level in the no innovation state for environmental
R&D with a benevolent planner:
lim
ρ→1
t¯Ω = t¯E =
B
(1 + β)
(60)
Already from the general derivation of the first order conditions, (36) and (56)
we were able to compare the expressions for the tax levels and notice the striking
difference. An extra negative term is added to the first order condition from the
influenced objective.
Proposition 9 In the case of no innovation the tax is lower in state of lobbyism
than the tax in the state of a benevolent planner, t¯Ω < t¯E.
Proof. Consider t¯Ω > t¯E then by rearranging (59) and (37) it follows that 0 >
(1− ρ). From the restriction ρ ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 ≥ (1− ρ) never holds. This
implies by contradiction that t¯Ω < t¯E.
Note that the tax level, derived from the influenced objective, is inserted into the
original welfare function to find an expression for realized welfare. By inserting (59)
into the original welfare function (14) we find the realized level of welfare in the
state of no innovation:
W¯E(Ω) =
ρB2
2(1 + ρβ)2
(2− ρ+ ρβ) (61)
From (61) we see that welfare is determined by the significance of the lobby param-
eter. Welfare decreases the stronger the influence by lobby groups. In the extreme
case with max lobbyism no welfare of abatement is realized since all weight in the
objective is on the private profit of the downstream firms:
lim
ρ→0
W¯E(Ω) = 0 (62)
This follows from a realized abatement level equal to zero, x = 0. Notice that even
though welfare of abatement becomes zero, there will be some realized welfare from
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the output q.
Proposition 10 The lobby parameter decreases the welfare in the no innovation
state due to the significance of influence, limρ→0 W¯E(Ω) = 0.
On the other hand, If the lobby parameter approaches one and the significance is
weaker, welfare becomes equivalent to the no innovation welfare of both market good
R&D and environmental R&D with a benevolent planner:
lim
ρ→1
W¯E(Ω) = W¯M = W¯E (63)
With approximately no lobbyism, the net welfare in the no innovation state will
coincide with the result in proposition 1.
10.2 Successful innovation
In the case of successful development the distorted objective for taxation becomes:
max
t
GΩ(x(t), q) = ρB(x(t)) + (1− ρ)Ω(q)− C(x(t), `(t)) (64)
The lobbyism applies extra costs in the objective and the result is a weaker policy.
The first order condition is given by:
(
B′(x)− Cx
)dx
dt
− C`d`
dt
− (1− ρ)
ρ
(
Cx
dx
dt
+ C`
d`
dt
)
= 0 (65)
An extra negative term is added to the equation, compared to (44). This implies
that the tax level (tΩ) derived from (65) would be lower compared to the tax in
case of environmental R&D with a benevolent planner, (tE). The significance of the
negative shift will depend on the value of the lobby parameter ρ.
To determine specific expressions we use backward induction and start out with
the producing firms following their taxation adjustment equation:
tΩ = Cx(x, `) + vx(x, `) (66)
From (66) we derive the abatement level as a function of the tax and the license fee:
x(t, `) =
t− `
α
(67)
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Given the realized abatement level (67) we can derive the best response function of
the innovator, `(tΩ) as a function of the lobby tax:
`Ω(tΩ) =
(1− α)tΩ
2
(68)
Then by inserting (68) into (67) the abatement level becomes a function of the tax
alone:
xΩ(tΩ) =
(1 + α)tΩ
2α
(69)
When inserting (69) the profit function of the downstream firms (53) becomes:
Ω = Ω(q)− 1 + 3α
8α
t2 (70)
The government maximize (64) subjected to (68), (69), (70), (6) and (12). Deriving
the first order condition we have an expression for the lobby tax in the successful
innovation state.
tΩ =
2αρB(1 + α)
ρβ(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α)
(71)
The limiting cases gives us:
lim
ρ→1
tΩ = tE (72)
lim
ρ→0
tΩ = 0 (73)
When lobbyism is weak, ρ → 1, the tax approaches the tax level in the case of a
benevolent planner. On the other hand, the stronger interest groups the lower is the
tax, until the tax fades out completely.
Proposition 11 In the case of successful innovation the tax is lower when lobbyism
is present than the tax in the state of a benevolent planner, tΩ < tE.
Proof. Consider tΩ > tE then by rearranging (71) and (45) it follows that 0 >
α(1 + 3α)(1 − ρ). From the restriction ρ ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 ≥ (1 − ρ) never
holds. This implies by contradiction that tΩ < tE.
When inserting the lobby tax (71) into the patent function (82) we can derive an
expression for the patent value in the case of lobbyism:
vΩ =
B2ρ2(1− α)α(1 + α)2
(ρβ(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(74)
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Inserting the lobby tax into the original welfare function (16) we have an expression
for realized welfare:
WE(Ω) =
ρB2
2
(
2α + 6α2 − ρα + ρβ − 3ρα2 + ρβα2 + 2ρβα
(ρβ(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(1+α)2−(2− ρ+ ρβ)
(1 + ρβ)2
)
(75)
The limiting cases gives us the same results as above:
lim
ρ→1
WE(Ω) = WE (76)
lim
ρ→0
WE(Ω) = 0 (77)
The stronger lobbyism, the more weight is put on the private profit in the objective
and less welfare is realized.
Proposition 12 The lobby parameter decreases the welfare in the successful inno-
vation state, limρ→0WE(Ω) = 0, due to the significance of influence.
10.3 Net surplus
The net surplus in presence of lobbyism is derived from (61) and (75):
∆WE(Ω) =
ρB2
2
(
ρβ(1 + α)2 + (2− ρ)α(1 + 3α)
(ρβ(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(1 + α)2 − (2− ρ+ ρβ)
(1 + ρβ)2
)
(78)
Lobbyism affects the only governmental instrument to remedy the environmental
market failure, such that less abatement is achieved and too little innovation is gen-
erated. However, a low tax makes the innovator able to charge a lower license fee
for the innovation such that more firms afford to purchase the new invention.
After deriving explicit expressions for the realized net welfare and the private return
in each R&D scenario we can start to systematically compare incentives. Following
proposition 2, the prize is determined as the difference in net welfare and patent
value, following from the regulators optimizing of incentives.
I will first compare net surplus in the different cases, followed by a comparison
of the patent values in each case. Thereafter I derive and analyze the prizes based
on the result from the two following sections.
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Figure 6: Comparison of net surplus (∆W i) given β = 0.3
11 Comparison of net surplus
Illustrated in figure 6 is the net welfare of the three different cases (34), (50) and
(78) and the maximum net surplus (24). The graph is drawn for a given value of
β set to 0.3. We see that net welfare depends on the significance of the innovation
quality, α. The better innovation thus greater net welfare is realized in all cases.
From figure 6 we see that maximum net surplus lies significantly above all other
realizations. Recall proposition 4 and proposition 8 where the two relationships:
∆WM < ∆W ∗ and ∆WE < ∆W ∗ was stated. The net welfare of any R&D case
will never reach the maximum level due to intellectual property rights.
From the limiting cases of ∆WE, equation (51) and (52), the net welfare is
approaching the maximum, as illustrated in figure 6, but the max is never reached.
Maximal net surplus is only achievable if the new invention is spread for free.
Net welfare in the case of environmental R&D (50) is larger than net welfare for
ordinary market goods (34), and this holds for any value of β ≥ 0. The difference,
∆WE − ∆WM ≥ 0, is more significant for high quality innovations, yielding more
social welfare in the environmental case due to the pollution externality.
Proposition 13 Net welfare in the case of environmental R&D with a benevolent
planner is greater than net welfare in case of market good R&D, ∆WM < ∆WE as
long as β > 0, given that all other parameters are equal.
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Proof. If ∆WM < ∆WE then by rearranging (50) and (34) it follows that β >
−α
(1+3α)
. Consider β < −α
(1+3α)
then β < 0, contradicting the restriction β ≥ 0. Con-
sider β = −α
(1+3α)
then β < 0, again contradicting the restriction β ≥ 0. Then it
follows that ∆WM < ∆WE.
The reason behind proposition 13 is the policy intervention by the government.
The planner determines the demand for R&D indirectly when setting the environ-
mental policy such that more innovation is stimulated and net welfare increase. The
emission tax will increase realized net welfare in the environmental case, even if the
innovation has the same social value in both cases.
Net welfare in the case of lobbyism shifts downwards and further away from
maximal net welfare the stronger lobbyism influences the welfare function, ρ → 0,
as illustrated in figure 6.
It follows from proposition 10 and proposition 12 that the net welfare in case
of lobbyism approaches the net welfare for environmental R&D with a benevolent
planner when lobbyism diminishes:
lim
ρ→1
∆WE(Ω) = ∆WE (79)
The poorer innovation, less net welfare is realized and it reaches the level of zero
sooner than the other cases, see figure 6:
lim
α→1
∆WE(Ω) = 0 (80)
The functions of net welfare depends on the parameter values. An comparison of
∆WM and ∆WE(Ω) will therefore depend on the combination of α and β for a
given value of ρ. To illustrate a comparison three examples are plotted, each with a
different lobbyparameter. Figure 7, figure 8 and figure 9 illustrates weak lobbyism,
strong lobbyism and intermediate lobbyism respectively.
The figures are 3D plots where net welfare is measured on the vertical axis,
and values of β (to the left) and α (to the right) on the two horizontal axes. The
net welfare for market good R&D (∆WM) is illustrated with a black “carpet”,
and the white “carpet” illustrates net welfare with lobbyism (∆WE(Ω)). For each
combination of α and β we can compare net welfare to see which effect dominates.
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Figure 7: 3D plot of ∆WM (black) and ∆WE(Ω) (white) given ρ = 0.9
Figure 8: 3D plot of ∆WM (black) and ∆WE(Ω) (white) given ρ = 0.1
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Figure 9: 3D plot of ∆WM (black) and ∆WE(Ω) (white) given ρ = 0.5
When the two planes (white and black) cross each other it implies that the net
welfare functions are equal for that specific combination of α, β and ρ. In figure 7 we
see that for weak impact of interest group the comparison reminds of proposition 13
where the net welfare for environmental R&D completely dominates the net welfare
of ordinary market good R&D. There is no intersection of the two planes.
Looking at figure 8 and figure 9 we notice that when the influence by lobby
groups is stronger the planes cross, and hence none effect strictly dominates the
other. This yields for any value of ρ larger than 0.9.
The 3D plots has a common feature, net welfare effects increases for low values
of α and low values of β. In this case the marginal benefit curve is steep giving a
great social gain when developing a good quality invention.
From these graphs, in figure 7, 8 and 9, I have illustrated that a general ranking
of the two net welfare functions, net welfare in case of lobbyism (∆WE(Ω)) compared
to the laissez-faire case (∆WM), is not possible:
Proposition 14 Comparing ∆WM to ∆WE(Ω) gives no specific ranking that holds
for all values of ρ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 10: The patent values of the three different R&D cases
12 Comparison of patent values
Figure 10 illustrates the different patent values for a given value of β. In the case
of lobbyism two distinct values of ρ is indicated in the figure. The graph illustrates
that highest revenue to the innovator is achieved in the case with environmental
R&D, given β = 0.3. This only states whats illustrated in the figure and it turns
out not to hold as a general result.
The lower quality on the innovation (α→ 1), less revenue is achieved. This holds
for all three R&D cases:
lim
α→1
vi = 0 i = M,E,E(Ω) (81)
In the case of market good R&D, the laissez-faire scenario, the demand for the new
technology is created from the downstream firms’ desire to reduce production costs.
The patent value is given by equation (32). We see that the patent value increases
the better quality (α → 0) the innovation has, dv
dα
< 0, and the patent increases in
social benefits, i.e dv
dβ
< 0.
For environmental R&D the patent is derived from v(x(t), `(t);α). Inserting (43)
and (42), or equivalent (69) and (68), gives a patent value determined by the tax:
vi(ti) =
(1− α)
4α
(ti)2 i = E,E(Ω) (82)
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Figure 11: The combinations of β and α that equalize vE to vM
where the patent increases in the tax level, dv
dt
> 0. With a higher tax on emissions
more firms are pushed over the threshold xˆ. Adapting the new technology becomes
profitable for more firms when abatement is costly, increasing the returns to the
innovator.
The patent value in the case of a benevolent planner is given by equation (48).
When comparing the patent of environmental R&D to the patent value of the laissez-
faire case we see from figure 11 what combinations of α and β that equalize the patent
values. There exist combinations where the private incentives to innovate is equal in
both scenarios. All combinations of α and β above the line yields vM > vE. Hence,
in our example a radical invention (α→ 0) implies a larger range of β for which this
holds. This gives the result from Graker and Hoel (2011):
Proposition 15 No general ranking of the patent values vE and vM is possible.
An expression for the patent value in the case of lobbyism is given by equation (74).
Lobbyism affects the revenue to the innovator indirectly through the environmental
policy, making it less profitable to invent. Weaker policy decreases incentives:
−dv
Ω
dρ
< 0 (83)
Proposition 16 The private incentives to invest in R&D decreases the more lobby
groups influences the objective of the planner, (ρ→ 0).
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Figure 12: 3D plot of vM (black) and vΩ (white) given ρ = 0.9
When interest groups put a downward pressure on the tax, the demand for environ-
mental R&D decreases. On the other hand, a low tax yields a low license fee such
that more firms can afford to purchase the new invention. The negative effect from
demand is stronger than the increased spread. Lobbyism gives a substantial nega-
tive shift in the patent value, and the effect is stronger for high quality inventions
(α→ 0), compared to the case with a benevolent planner.
Proposition 17 In the presence of lobbyism the patent value decreases, vΩ < vE
due to less private incentives.
Proof. Consider vΩ > vE, then by rearranging (48) and (74) it follows that
0 > α(1 + 3α)(1−ρ). From the restriction ρ ∈ (0, 1) we know that 0 ≥ (1−ρ) never
holds. This implies that vΩ < vE and the proposition holds.
Comparing the patent value in presence of lobbyism to the patent value in the
laissez-faire does not give a general ranking, holding for all values of ρ. The com-
parison of vM and vΩ is illustrated in two 3D plots, figure 13 and figure 12. The
patent value is measured on the vertical axis, and this is graphed for two different
values of ρ, strong and weak.
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Figure 13: 3D plot of vM (black) and vΩ (white) given ρ = 0.3
We see from figure 12 that in the case of weak lobbyism the two patent values
coincides for low values of β, giving an ambiguous ranking. When lobbyism is
weak the patent value vΩ approaches vE such that this result follow the result in
proposition 15, where a comparison gave no possible ranking.
Figure 13 illustrate the comparison for a intermediate lobby parameter, and the
same picture is given for all other values of the lobby parameter. The figure illustrate
that for all values of ρ 6= 0.9 the patent value in the lobby case lies underneath the
patent for market good R&D. This imply that significant lobbyism ρ > 0.9 decreases
the private incentives to invest in green R&D.
Proposition 18 There exist no possible ranking of vΩ and vM that holds for all val-
ues of ρ ∈ (0, 1). For significant influence of lobbygroups, ρ > 0.9, private incentives
decrease, vΩ < vM , due to weaker environmental policy.
In contrast to the analysis in Greaker and Hoel (2011) this thesis includes the ef-
fects on net welfare when analyzing incentives. The interesting research question is
whether the decrease in net welfare exceeds the decrease in private revenue. There-
fore I analyze prizes to compare the differences of (∆W i − vi) for i = M,E,E(Ω).
55
13 Prizes
In this section I analyze prizes based on the findings in the two previous sections. I
derive prizes for each R&D scenario, market good R&D (PM), environmental R&D
with a benevolent planner (PE) and environmental R&D in presence of lobbyism
(PΩ). First I compare incentives in an ordinary commitment problem, as in Greaker
and Hoel (2011). Thereafter I analyze an extended commitment problem to see how
this result comply with my hypothesis that incentives to environmental R&D is
lower than the incentives to ordinary market good R&D.
The definition of innovation prizes was given by proposition 2:
P i = ∆W i − vi i = M,E,Ω (84)
A positive prize signify necessary inducement. If the prize is zero it means that social
and private gain of successful innovation equalize, ∆W i = vi, and no inducement
is needed. By comparing the prizes for the different R&D cases, we are actually
comparing incentives. A ranking of prizes yields a possible ranking of incentives.
13.1 Comparing PM and PE
In this section I compare the incentives in an ordinary commitment problem, simi-
lar to Greaker and Hoel (2011). This issue was first discussed in Laffont and Tirole
(1996) where they indicated that no R&D would be implemented due to the com-
mitment problem. In this analysis I show how an innovation prize can restore the
optimal level of incentives depending on the parameter values of α and β.
The prize for market good R&D is derived from (34) and (32):
PM =
B2
2
(1− α)
4(α + β)(1 + β)
(85)
We see from expression (85) that PM increases the better quality of the invention,
(α → 0). For low values of α the appropriability problem is greater since the
invention is more valuable, giving a high positive prize to restore incentives. The
less social value of the invention, the less inducement is needed:
lim
α→1
PM = 0 (86)
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Figure 14: Combinations of α and β that equalize PM and PE
It follows from (85) that the prize increases in social benefit, B(x). High values of
β gives less social benefits and then smaller inducement prize is needed.
For the case of environmental R&D with a benevolent planner the prize is derived
from (50) and (48):
PE =
B2
2
(
β(1 + α)2 + α(5α− 1)
(β(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(1 + α)2 − 1
(1 + β)
)
(87)
By this expression we see that PE is not monotonically increasing in neither inno-
vation quality nor slope of the benefit curve. The cross derivative also depends on
other parameters, complicating the analysis of the function.
The comparison of innovation prizes for marked good R&D (PM) and environ-
mental R&D with a benevolent planner (PE) seem to confirm the results in Greaker
and Hoel (2011). This rejects my hypothesis that incentives to environmental R&D
is lower than incentives to market good R&D. The comparison gives an arbitrary
result, relying on the combination of the parameter values.
When comparing PM to PE we see that the level of the benefit function B
has no impact on the difference. The comparison in illustrated in both figure 14
and figure 15. In figure 14 the line indicates which combinations of α and β that
equalize the prizes, PM = PE. Interpreting figure 14 we see how the combinations
of β and α above the curve yields a higher prize to environmental R&D, indicating
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Figure 15: 3D plot of PM (black) and PE (white)
understimulated incentives, PM < PE. Below the curve we have the combinations
that yields PM > PE. A high quality invention, i.e. a low α, implies a broader
range of β for which PM < PE.
Figure 15 is a 3D plot of the same comparison. This figure illustrates how the
prizes change for a broader range of α and β. The prize for environmental R&D has
a shape like a “wave”, illustrating why the derivatives is not monotonic. For high
values of β the environmental prize dominates, and for low values of β the market
good prize dominates. The extent of the dominance depends on α. The intersection
of the two planes is the line in figure 14.
We know from proposition 13 that net welfare is higher for environmental R&D,
∆WE > ∆WM . However, comparison of the different patent values, vE and vM ,
was arbitrary, review proposition 15. These two results determine the comparison
of PM and PE.
Proposition 19 No general ranking of PM and PE is possible
This result show that the conclusion in Greaker and Hoel (2011) holds when includ-
ing the net welfare effect, although they only look at private return to the innovator.
The effect on incentives is still ambiguous and depends on the combinations of the
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parameter values, α and β. This result implies that innovation prizes may solve
the appropriability problem but we cannot state that the market failure is larger
for environmental R&D than market good R&D. Thus, the innovation prize for
environmental R&D should not necessarily be larger than for market good R&D.
Although such cases may exist, depending on the combinations of innovation quality
and social benefits of output. Hence, we cannot make a general rule stating that
innovation prizes are better suited for environmental R&D in this example.
13.2 Comparing PM and PΩ
To examine whether my hypothesis holds for other environmental R&D scenarios,
I compare incentives in case of lobbyism (PΩ) to incentives in the case of marked
good R&D (PM). I will show that we cannot reject the hypothesis for intermediate
values of political disturbance.
The contribution of this analysis is the incorporation of political disturbance.
The question is whether an innovation prize can solve an extended commitment
problem. Calculating the prize for environmental R&D with lobbyism from (78)
and (74) gives:
PΩ =
ρB2
2
(
ρβ(1 + α)2 + 2α(1 + 3α)− ρα(α + 3)
(ρβ(1 + α)2 + α(1 + 3α))2
(1 + α)2 − (2− ρ+ ρβ)
(1 + ρβ)2
)
(88)
where the lobby prize is a function of three variables, α, β and ρ, (B is redundant).
The lobby prize (88) is not monotonically decreasing or increasing in ρ ∈ (0, 1),
complicating the analysis.
To investigate the extended commitment problem we need a comparison of the
lobby prize (PΩ) to the prize for marked good R&D (PM). The previous sections
with comparison of the net welfare functions and the patent values have indicated
that a specific ranking is unobtainable. It appears that if we avoid the extreme
values of the lobbyparameter, and restrict the analysis to intermediate lobbyism we
obtain a result where PΩ dominates PM .
We start out by analyzing the two extreme cases, where ρ→ 1 and ρ→ 0. Note
that we have assumed the limits is never reached, ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Illustrated in figure 16 is the combinations of β and α that equalize the prizes,
PM = PΩ for very strong lobbyism, ρ = 0.1. Interpreting the figure we see that for
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low α a broader range of β imply PM < PΩ.
The same issue is illustrated In the 3D plot in figure 17. The size of the prizes
are measured on the vertical axis, and values of β and α on the two horizontal
axes. The prize for market good R&D is illustrated with a black “carpet” that lies
underneath the white “carpet” illustrating the lobby prize. In the lower corner to the
right, where β is low and α is high, we see that PM exceeds PΩ (the black “carpet”
covers the white). This denotes a scenario where abatement has great social value
but the innovation is poor and lobbyism is particular strong. In this scenario the
is no need for inducement. Note that both prizes approaches zero for poor quality
inventions. These two figures illustrates that for very strong lobbyism, ρ = 0.1, a
specific ranking of PM and PΩ is not possible.
Analyzing the opposite extreme value of the lobby parameter, we see how the
two prizes behave as lobbyism diminish. If there is approximately no influence from
lobbyism (ρ→ 1) the lobby prize coincides with the prize in the environmental case
with a benevolent planner, and hence no specific ranking is possible.
lim
ρ→1
PΩ = PE (89)
This is illustrated in a 3D plot, figure 18. We observe a similar intersection between
PM and PΩ as in figure 18. For a certain combination the two plains coincide. For
low value of β the market good prize PM dominates, but for high values of β the
lobby prize PΩ dominates, as in figure 14. This makes a specific ranking of incentives
impossible for ρ = 0.9.
When choosing a lobby parameter between the two extreme values, we get plots
similar to figure 19. We see that the lobby prize always exceed the market good
R&D prize for any combination of β and α. The white plane completely covers
the black plane. The same picture yields for all intermediate values of the lobby
parameter, ρ ∈ [0.2, 0.8].
The difference of the prizes, PΩ − PM > 0 is more significant for radical inno-
vations (α→ 0). Notice how the gap between the two planes increases in the front
corner. The two planes decreases towards zero for high values of α. Low quality
innovations gives little social gain and is not in need of extra inducement, indepen-
dent of R&D case. The high values of PΩ when α and β are low, signal the need for
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Figure 16: Illustrating the ambigous result PM = PΩ when ρ = 0.1
Figure 17: 3D plot of PM (black) and PΩ (white) given ρ = 0.1
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Figure 18: 3D plot of PM (black) and PΩ (white) given ρ = 0.9
Figure 19: 3D plot of PM (black) and PΩ (white) given ρ = 0.3
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inducement mechanisms.
Proposition 20 The lobby prize exceeds the prize for market good R&D, PΩ > PM
for intermediate values of the lobby parameter, ρ ∈ [0.2, 0.8].
Implying that the incentives for environmental R&D in presence of moderate lob-
byism is significantly lower compared to market good R&D. This is the main result
of the thesis, making us keep the hypothesis. But no general rule for the use of
innovation prizes has been established.
The research question of this thesis was whether the difference, ∆WE(Ω)−vΩ was
exceeding the difference of ∆WM − vM , and hence whether a prize could solve the
extended commitment problem. By this analysis I have showed that this yields for
intermediate values of the lobby parameter, but the ranking breaks as ρ approaches
one of the two extreme values.
This imply that the appropriability problem is larger for environmental R&D
in case of lobbyism than for ordinary market good R&D. Hence, a larger market
failure yield a larger inducement mechanism. I have showed how innovation prizes
can remedy this market failure and restore the optimal level of incentives.
14 Discussion
The analysis has been based on the issue of governmental commitment problem
distorting the incentives to invest in R&D. Given a successful outcome the planner
may be tempted to expropriate rents from the innovation, and by adjusting the tax
the planner can limit the innovator’s ability to extract monopoly profit.
Timing has therefore been a crucial assumption. In this model I have only con-
sidered the case where environmental policy is set after the R&D process is carried
out, but before the innovator sets her license fee. The innovator must undercut the
tax when setting the license fee to uphold the profitability. To obtain widespread
diffusion of the innovative knowledge the license fee should be as low as possible.
Social optimal outcome is only obtained if the fee is set to zero. This is only feasible
by simultaneously lowering the private payoff to the innovator, and hence the in-
centives to invest in R&D. This is the crucial trade-off between knowledge creation
and knowledge use. Had the timing been different, i.e. the planner acted after the
innovator, the commitment problem is eliminated.
63
I have assumed the small firms in the downstream sector has the selective in-
centive to create pressure groups that manages to reduce the tax. The result is
determined by the assumption that the environmentalists lack the power to unite
and push the lobbyism back. If the two opposite groups had the same level of in-
fluence on the objective, the realized welfare would not differ from the case with a
benevolent planner.
The assumption of only one pollutive sector can be criticized for being too sim-
plifying. For the environmental problem of climate change there are many diverse
pollutive sectors emitting the same type of pollution. If the new technology devel-
oped by the single innovator only adapt for one sector, the planner may not be able
to expropriate rents form the innovation and the commitment problem is no longer
an issue.
If the research took place either in the dowstream sector or was public funded
such that the new knowledge was spread free of charge, the issue of this model
disappears. The problem is derived from the innovator’s ability to control access to
her invention through the patent rights, and the social planners desire to counteract
this control. My aim was to investigate this interesting scenario. If I had chosen to
look at prizes as patent buyouts, the tension between the innovator and the welfare
maximizer would have been lost.
Innovation prizes, as described in this thesis, is an inducement mechanism that
can be implemented without changing the well funded patent system. This thesis
did not argue for prizes as an alternative to intellectual property rights, but rather
as a complement when the welfare loss is distinct.
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15 Conclusion
In this thesis I have presented a model based on the working paper by Greaker
and Hoel (2011), where incentives to R&D is systematically compared to investigate
whether they attain a specific ranking. I have included welfare effects in the modeling
of incentives and introduced an aspect of political economy. The main contribution
is the analysis of innovation prizes as the inducement mechanism to restore the social
optimal level of incentives. No literature, as far as I know, model this type of ex
ante innovation prizes in a general framework of incentives to environmental R&D.
In their working paper Greaker and Hoel (2011) base the model of incentives
on the comparison of private return to the innovator. Their aim is to conduct
the comparison in a general economic model of innovations. No specific ranking of
ordinary market good R&D compared to environmental R&D is possible.
My point of departure has been the difference between market good R&D in a
laissez-faire economy compared to environmental R&D in context of a commitment
problem. The crucial aspect of green technology is that demand for environmen-
tal R&D is determined by planner’s choice of environmental policy. The research
question of Greaker and Hoel was whether the commitment problem distorted the
incentives to green R&D. My research question has been whether innovation prizes
are a suitable inducement mechanism if incentives to environmental R&D was lower
than to market good R&D.
This thesis argues for using inducement prizes as a payment pre-commitment
mechanism to restore potential distortions. But the result from a comparison of
incentives with a standard commitment problem gave no specific ranking.
By including an aspect of political disturbance this thesis have showed that
the incentives to environmental R&D is lower than incentives to ordinary market
good R&D. This analysis found a significant difference if the benevolent planner
is influenced by interest groups and not able to set the optimal tax. The planner
suffers from “weakness of will”, modeled by a weighted average, where the objective
becomes linear in the lobby parameter in the decisive moment. For intermediate
values of lobbyism there exist a specific ranking of incentives. This systematic
difference in incentives to R&D can be used as an argument for increased support
to environmental R&D.
65
16 References
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn and D. Hemous (2012) “The Environment
and Directed Technical Change”, in The American Economic Review, Vol. 102 (1),
131-166.
Acemoglu, D. (2003) “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Com-
mitment, and Politics”, in Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 31, 620 – 652.
Aghion P., A. Dechezlepreˆtre, D. Hemous, R. Martin and J. van Reenen (2014)
“Carbon Taxes, Path Dependency and Directed Technical Change: Evidence from
the Auto Industry”, CEP Discussion paper 1178, forthcoming in Journal of Political
Economy.
Bommer, R. and G. G. Schulze (1999) “Environmental improvement with trade
liberalization”, in European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 15, 639 - 661.
Brennan, T. J., M. K. Macauley and K. S. Whitefoot (2012) “Prizes or Patents
for Technology Procurement”, RFF Discussion Paper.
Brunt, L., J. Lerner and T. Nicholas (2011) “Inducement Prizes and Innovation”,
in Harvard Business School Working Paper, 11-118.
Dasgupta, P. and J. Stiglitz (1980) “Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed
of R&D”, in Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 11 (1), 1-28.
Davis, L. (2002) “Should We Consider Alternative Incentives for Basic Research?
Patents vs. Prizes”, presentation paper at the DRUID Summer Conference 2002.
Davis, L. (2003) “Intellectual Property Rights, Strategy and Policy”, in Economics
of Innovation and new Technology, Vol 13 (5), 399 – 415.
Davis, L. and J. Davis (2004) “How effective are prizes as Incentives to Innovation?
Evidence from three 20th Centry Contests”, presentation paper at the DRUID Sum-
66
mer Conference 2004.
Foray, D. (2004) Economics of Knowledge, the MIT Press, Massachusetts.
Gerlagh, R., S. Kverndokk and K. E. Rosendahl (2009) “Optimal Timing of Cli-
mate Policy: Interaction between Carbon Taxes and Innovation Externalities”, in
Environmental Resource Economics, Vol. 43, 369 - 390.
Greaker, M. and M. Hoel (2011) “Incentives for Environmental R&D”, CESifo Work-
ing Papers No. 3468.
Greaker, M. and M. Hoel (2014) “The appropriability problem and the need to
prioritize environmental R&D”, Unpublished paper
Grupp, H. (1998) Foundations of the Economics of Innovation, Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, Cheltenham UK.
Hall, B. H. and N. Rosenberg (2010) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation,
Elsevier, Vol. 1 - 2.
Hoffert, M. I., K. Caldeira, G. Benford, D. R. Criswell, C. Green, H. Herzog, A. K.
Jain, H. S. Kheshgi, K. S. Lewis, H. D. Lightfoot, W. Manheimer, J. C. Mankins,
M. E. Mauel, L. J. Perkins, M. E. Schlesinger, T. Volk and T. M. L. Wigley (2002)
“Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse
Planet”, in Science, Vol 298, 981-987.
Hopenhayn, H., G. Llobet and M. Mitchell (2006), in Journal of Political Econ-
omy, Vol. 114 (6).
Horrobin, D. F. (1986) “Glittering prizes for research support”, in Nature, Vol 324,
221.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), (2013) “Climate Change 2013:
67
The Physical Science Basis”, Fifth Assessment Report, Working Group I.
Jaffe, A. B., R. G. Newell and R. N. Stavins (2005) “A Tale of Two Market Fail-
ures”, in Ecological Economics, Vol. 54, 164 – 174.
Jaffe, A. B., R. G. Newell and D. Popp (2010) “Energy, the environment, and
technological Change”, in Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Hall, Bronwyn
H. and Nathan Rosenberg (Eds.), Elsevier, Vol 2, Ch 21.
Kalil, T. (2006) “Prizes for Technological Innovation”, The Brookings Institution,
The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper 2006 – 08.
Kremer, M. (1998) “Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation”,
in The Quartely Journal of Economics, Vol. 113 (4): 1137 - 1167.
Kremer, M. (2001a) “Creating Markets for New Vaccines Innovation – Part I: Ra-
tionale”, in Policy and the Economy, Jaffe, Adam B., Josh Lerner and Scott Stern
(Eds.), Vol. 1, 35 - 75.
Kremer, M. (2001b) “Creating Markets for New Vaccines Innovation – Part II:
Design Issues”, in Policy and the Economy, Jaffe, Adam B., Josh Lerner and Scott
Stern (Eds.), Volume 1, 73 - 118.
Kremer, M. and A. P. Zwane (2002) “Encouraging technical progress in tropical
agriculture”, background paper for the United Nations Development Program, Hu-
man Development Report 2001: Channeling Technology for Human Development.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1996) “Pollution Permits and Environmental Inno-
vation”, in Journal of Public Economics, 62, 127-140.
Newell, R. G. and N. E. Wilson (2005) “Technology Prizes for Climate Change
Mitigation”, RFF Discussion Paper.
68
Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge.
Polanyi, M. (1944) “Patent Reform”, in Review of Economics Studies II, no. 2,
61 - 76
Requate, T. (2005) “Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy, Adoption
of New Technology, and Repercussions on R&D”, in Environmental and Resource
Economics, Vol. 31 (2), 175 - 199.
Sandmo, A. (2000) The Public Economics of the Environment, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2008) The Theory of Economic Development, Transaction Pub-
lishers, London.
Scotchmer, S. (2004) Innovation and Incentives, The MIT Press, London, England.
Shavell, S. and T. van Ypersele (2001) “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights”,
in Journal of Law and Economics, Vol XLIV.
Stiglitz, J. (2014) “Intellectual Property Rights, the Pool of Knowledge, and In-
novation”, NBER Working Paper No. 2014.
Sweezy, P. M. (1943) “Professor Schumpeter’s Theory of Innovation”, in The Review
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 25, No. 1.
Weyl, E. G. and J. Tirole (2012) “Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay”, in
Quarterley Journal of Economics, Vol 127 (4), 1971 - 2003.
Wright, B. D. (1983) “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes and
Research Contracts”, in The American Economic Review, Vol. 73 (4), 691-707.
69
